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INTRODUCTION

This Article defends one of the more controversial parts of
the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of
1998 (RRA 98),1 the so-called collection due process (CDP)
provisions.2 CDP gives taxpayers the right to independent
administrative and judicial review of Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) decisions to levy property or file a notice of federal tax lien.
Critics of CDP have claimed that it is wasteful of precious IRS
compliance resources and that it is primarily a tool for tax
protestors to advance frivolous arguments about the
government’s taxing and collection powers.3 These criticisms
have contributed to legislative proposals to repeal some or all of
4
5
its protections and to pointed academic criticism about the
6
provisions’ utility.
1. Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105206, 112 Stat. 685.
2. 26 U.S.C. §§ 6320, 6330 (2000) (setting forth lien and levy provisions respectively).
3. See IRS, NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE: 2003 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 38
(2003)
[hereinafter
2003
REPORT]
(summarizing
criticisms
of
CDP),
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/nta_2003_
annual_update_mcw_1-15-041.pdf.
4. Tax Administration Good Government Act, S. 882, 108th Cong. § 209 (2003)
(proposing an amendment to I.R.C. § 6702 to authorize the IRS to assess a $5000 civil
penalty for frivolous CDP submissions or submissions that attempt to delay or impede the
administration of the tax laws and to allow the IRS to dismiss frivolous requests without
following otherwise mandated CDP procedures).
5. See, e.g., Bryan T. Camp, Tax Administration as Inquisitorial Process and the
Partial Paradigm Shift in the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, 56 FLA. L. REV. 1,
122 (2004) (explaining that “the CDP provisions have been a boon to tax protestors and a
pain to everyone else”); Danshera Cords, How Much Process Is Due?: IRC Section 6320 and
6330 Collection Due Process Hearing, 29 VT. L. REV. (forthcoming 2004) (manuscript at 4, on
file with Author) (stating that “without significant clarification of the CDP provisions, CDP
hearings should be abolished”); Steve Johnson, The 1998 Act and the Resources Link
Between Tax Compliance and Tax Simplification, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 1013, 1061 (2003)
[hereinafter Johnson, 1998 Act] (noting that “many requests for CDP relief have been filed
asserting only frivolous, often rejected, or protestor-type arguments”).
6. There are a number of converging factors that make the general debate over CDP
and tax collection especially timely. Collection cases, particularly those involving CDP, are
now an important part of IRS Appeals determinations and are an increasing component of
the Tax Court’s overall docket. For example, in the last three years, CDP has accounted for
between twenty-eight and thirty-five percent of all IRS Appeals cases. See 2003 REPORT,
supra note 3, at 46 tbl. 1.4.1 (giving statistics on the percentage of IRS Appeals receipts that
were CDP receipts in recent years). Prior to RRA 98, in fiscal year 1997 only fourteen
percent of IRS Appeals cases involved collections. Id. at 50. Moreover, with the budget
surplus projections of the late 1990s now looking like an unending series of deficits, we seem
to be experiencing a tax reform hangover, with some observers wondering whether RRA 98’s
protections, including CDP, and the post-1998 drop in IRS compliance efforts may be
shaking the ethos of voluntary compliance that is a foundation of our tax system. See Amy
Hamilton, A Look at Taxpayer Attitudes on Fifth Anniversary of IRS Reform, TAX NOTES
TODAY, July 22, 2003, LEXIS, 2003 TNT 140-4 (reporting on the general consensus that
taxpayer attitudes are increasingly pessimistic about the IRS); see also David Cay Johnston,

10412-TEXT.NATIVE.1105543696

1150

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

1/12/2005 7:28 AM

[41:4

Prior to CDP’s enactment, the IRS had the power to collect
taxes from taxpayers without judicial review of administrative
collection determinations. This awesome power, atypical for
creditors, who often must get judicial approval for summary
collection action, led many observers to criticize the IRS’s powers
as dangerous,7 even when there was no dispute that a taxpayer
owed back taxes.8 Notwithstanding this criticism, CDP’s
formalization of parts of the administrative collection process and
imposition of judicial review over certain IRS collection actions
has itself been controversial and subject to criticism for wasting
and inappropriately diverting administrative resources from
compliance.9 This Article reveals how administrative and
constitutional law principles that provide checks on arbitrary
government determinations have largely been absent from tax
collection adjudications. CDP’s adoption serves as a progression
New I.R.S. Chief Plans to Focus on Enforcement, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2003, at C6 (reporting
that IRS Commissioner Mark W. Everson is “troubled by an I.R.S. Oversight Board survey
last month showing that 17 percent of Americans believe that it is acceptable to cheat on
taxes, up from 11 percent in 1999”).
7. The IRS’s increasingly important role as deliverer of benefits exacerbates the
potential danger of erroneous IRS collection action. See Fred T. Goldberg, Jr., From FDR to
W: The IRS as Financial Intermediary, 29 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1, 1–9 (2002) (discussing the
growing importance of the IRS as a provider of benefits to taxpayers in addition to its more
traditional role as collector of taxes from taxpayers). Compounding the potential harm is the
increasing frequency with which tax collection adjudications involve determinations to
collect back refundable benefits, such as the earned income tax credit, that the IRS
improperly paid out to taxpayers. See DAVID CAY JOHNSTON, PERFECTLY LEGAL: THE
COVERT CAMPAIGN TO RIG OUR TAX SYSTEM TO BENEFIT THE SUPER RICH—AND CHEAT
EVERYBODY ELSE 130–36 (2003) (explaining that the IRS has recently focused its compliance
efforts disproportionately on the working poor). Professor Johnston points out, for example,
that in 2002 “one in 47 of the working poor had their returns audited, compared to one in
145 of the affluent and one in 400 returns filed by partnerships, which are used mostly by
the wealthy.” Id. at 134–35.
8. A prime example of this attitude can be found in a book coauthored by the late,
former chair of the Senate Finance Committee. WILLIAM V. ROTH, JR. & WILLIAM H. NIXON,
THE POWER TO DESTROY 91–93 (1999). The book is full of anecdotes describing how
unchecked IRS collection practices have contributed to the personal ruin or even suicide of
taxpayers. See id. at 3–8.
9. See Johnson, 1998 Act, supra note 5, at 1060–61 (explaining that parts of RRA 98,
especially the CDP provisions, are not helping “honest taxpayers harassed by the system but
taxpayers who harass the system”). Professor Johnson argues that a simplification of the tax
system, via rolling back some of RRA 98’s recent procedural reforms (including portions of
the CDP provisions), would free up IRS resources and allow the IRS the opportunity in
difficult budgetary times to dedicate the resources necessary to reverse the relatively steep
decline in IRS compliance. Id. at 1054–55.
Lack of resources has a negative impact on the IRS’s ability to collect taxes. For
example, starting in 1999, the IRS began to defer collection action on billions of dollars in
tax deficiencies. By September 2002, the IRS had deferred collection actions on
approximately one out of every three collection cases, and the “inventory of known unpaid
taxes totaled $249 billion, of which $112 billion has some collection potential.” GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-732T COMPLIANCE AND COLLECTION: CHALLENGES FOR IRS
IN REVERSING TRENDS AND IMPLEMENTING NEW INITIATIVES 6–8 (2003).
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toward adopting broader rule of law principles in the tax system.
Although CDP embraces rule of law principles, it is far from
perfect. It is both overbroad and underinclusive. CDP is
overbroad because it provides protections for matters unrelated
to collection, matters that cloud its essential benefits and provide
tax protestors with an administrative and judicial forum for
frivolous arguments that waste agency and judicial resources.10 It
is also underinclusive, however, because it fails to address the
thousands of IRS collection determinations that taxpayers raise
outside the CDP process. This Article argues that Congress
should amend, the IRS should administer, and the courts should
interpret CDP in a manner that addresses the under and
overinclusive nature of CDP. This Article also provides a basis to
defend CDP in light of broader administrative and constitutional
law principles. At the same time, this Article provides the means
to resist well-intentioned but misguided calls to eliminate CDP
and provides the basis to allow CDP to develop appropriately to
address both the government’s interest in efficiently collecting
taxes and the varied individual interests in the collection process.
This Article will proceed as follows. For those unfamiliar
with tax collection, Part II briefly considers IRS collection
procedures and the changes that CDP brought to that process.
Part III examines principles from administrative and
constitutional law and reveals how tax adjudications have largely
existed outside the mainstream of these two important external
checks on agency behavior. In light of the tax adjudications’
isolation from these disciplines, this Article shows that Congress
and the Supreme Court have implicitly and explicitly overstated
the government’s interest in the collection process and
understated the individual’s interest. In light of these
administrative and constitutional law principles, Part IV makes
specific proposals to improve CDP, with the related goals of
providing the means for policymakers both to appreciate the
potential for CDP to provide more meaningful taxpayer
protections and to minimize the overinclusive aspects of CDP
that are imposing significant systemic costs and straining
valuable tax compliance resources.

10. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 108TH CONG., REPORT OF THE JOINT
COMMITTEE ON TAXATION RELATING TO THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE AS REQUIRED BY
THE IRS REFORM AND RESTRUCTURING ACT OF 1998, app. at 22 (Comm. Print 2003) (noting
that although only five percent of CDP cases involve frivolous claims, they take a
disproportionate share of time compared to claims having substantive issues).
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II. THE BROAD OUTLINES OF THE TAX COLLECTION PROCESS
A. A Tax Collection Primer
1. Tax Collection Before CDP. Before revealing
administrative law and constitutional law’s place in the tax
collection process, it is important to understand the broad
contours of how the IRS collects taxes from taxpayers. When
taxpayers fail to pay all or a portion of a tax due and showing on
a tax return,11 or if the IRS determines that a taxpayer has a
greater tax liability than is reflected on a return,12 the IRS has
powerful administrative collection powers.13 After the taxpayer
files a balance due return, or after the IRS determines an
additional tax due following deficiency procedures, if a taxpayer
fails to pay the liability, a lien arises in favor of the United States
with respect to all of the taxpayer’s property or rights to
property.14 This lien is often called a secret or silent lien because
it arises automatically following taxpayer nonpayment.15 The IRS

11. I.R.C. § 6201(a)(1) authorizes the IRS to assess taxes shown by taxpayers on their
tax returns. I.R.C. § 6201(a)(1) (West 2004). An assessment is the IRS’s recording of a
taxpayer’s tax liability. See MICHAEL I. SALTZMAN, IRS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
¶ 10.01[1], at 10-3 to 10-4 (rev. 2d ed. 2002) (explaining that a valid assessment makes a
taxpayer’s outstanding tax liabilities collectible by lien or seizure upon notice and demand to
the taxpayer).
12. I.R.C. §§ 6212 and 6213 limit the power of the IRS to assess additional income,
estate, and gift taxes against a taxpayer who responds to deficiency procedures by
challenging the existence of a proposed liability in an Article I prepayment forum, the U.S.
Tax Court. I.R.C. §§ 6212(c)(1), 6213(a). A simple definition of deficiency is the difference
between the correct tax liability and the tax shown on the return. See SALTZMAN, supra note
11, ¶ 10.03[1], at 10-16. Timely taxpayer challenges to IRS assertions of a proposed
deficiency generally result in a stay on the IRS’s assessment and collection activities. See
I.R.C. § 6213(a).
The Tax Court’s jurisdiction to redetermine the IRS’s administrative determination of
a deficiency only applies to those taxes that are subject to the deficiency procedures—that is,
the rates that require the issuance of a statutory notice of deficiency before an assessment.
I.R.C. § 6213(a). Taxes subject to the deficiency procedures include: (1) “income, estate, gift,
and generation-skipping transfer taxes”; (2) “excess profits taxes”; and (3) “miscellaneous
excise taxes.” (((VSF))) The deficiency procedures do not apply to most excise taxes,
employment taxes, the § 6672 responsible person penalty, and certain other civil penalties.
GERALD A. KAFKA & RITA A. CAVANAGH, LITIGATION OF FEDERAL CIVIL TAX CONTROVERSIES
¶¶ 1.04[1]-1.04[2] & n.50 (2d ed. 1997).
13. These types of assessments are commonly known as summary assessments and
deficiency assessments. See SALTZMAN, supra note 11, ¶ 10.01[2][b].
14. I.R.C. § 6321 (creating a lien that extends to the amount of tax liability including
interest, additions, penalties, and costs).
15. See WILLIAM T. PLUMB, JR., FEDERAL TAX LIENS § 2, at 10 (3d ed. 1972)
(explaining that “it is quite possible that a financially troubled taxpayer, who has deferred
payment of an assessed tax, will not know whether or when a tax lien has been imposed
upon all his property because initially the general tax lien is usually of the secret variety”).
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may file a notice of the existence of that tax lien to ensure that
the lien is valid against certain third persons who may acquire or
gain an interest in a taxpayer’s property.16 Following additional
IRS requests for payment, if the taxpayer refuses to pay the tax,
the IRS may provisionally collect the tax by levy upon all
property or interests in property.17 The levy power is a
provisional remedy, as it does not determine whether the
taxpayer actually owes the underlying taxes or whether a third
party
’ s interest in levied property is superior to that of the
government.18 It does, however, allow the government to seize
and dispose of property before an adjudication determining the
validity of the assessment or the interests of other claimants has
occurred.19 Although state law exemptions protecting property
from the reach of creditors do not limit the IRS’s powers, the
Internal Revenue Code does provide its own list of property
exempt from a tax levy, including unemployment benefits, most
welfare benefits, and a limited amount of wages or salary.20
Section 6321 provides that the tax lien arises automatically after assessment, notice and
demand for payment, and a failure to pay, without any need for public notice. I.R.C. § 6231.
Section 6323(a) provides that this “secret” lien is not valid against four broad classes of
creditors until public notice is given. I.R.C. § 6323(a) (requiring notice to “any purchaser,
holder of a security interest, mechanic’s lienor, or judgment lien creditor”).
16. Once the Notice of Federal Tax Lien is filed, only a small group of creditors can
assert a priority higher than the government’s. See I.R.C. § 6323(b) (assigning priority under
certain conditions to purchasers of securities, motor vehicles, or personal property; property
tax liens; mechanic’s liens; attorney’s liens; insurance contracts; and deposit-secured loans).
See generally DAVID A. SCHMUDDE, FEDERAL TAX LIENS ch. 4 (4th ed. 2001). Persons having
actual knowledge of the tax lien’s existence would lose their protected status even in the
absence of a filing of a Notice of Federal Tax Lien. See I.R.C. § 6323(b).
17. See I.R.C. § 6331(a) (authorizing Secretary to collect tax plus collection expenses
by levy if taxpayer does not pay tax within ten days of notice and demand). This rule
generally does not extend to property or rights to property not in existence at the time of the
levy; however, there is an exception to this exclusion for certain recurring payments, such as
wages. See I.R.C. § 6331(h).
18. Alternatively, or in addition to the administrative levy provisions, the government
may bring a variety of civil judicial actions to effect the collection of taxes, enforce its lien, or
subject a taxpayer’s property to the payment of taxes. See I.R.C. §§ 7401–7403 (allowing the
United States, joined by all persons in interest, to bring a civil action in district court if
approved by the Secretary and Attorney General); 4 BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE
LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS ¶ 111.6.6 (2d ed. 1992). Civil
actions to enforce a lien or subject property to the payment of tax under § 7403, as
contrasted with the provisional levy procedures discussed above, determine the validity of
the assessment and the priority of other lienors. 4 BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra. If a taxpayer
has no other known property on which to levy, an action under § 7403 resulting in a
judgment can be enforced on subsequently acquired property. Id.
19. If property wrongfully becomes subject to a levy, I.R.C. § 7426 provides a remedy
in federal district court for third parties. I.R.C. § 7426(a)(1). The remedy may include an
injunction preventing the government from enforcing the levy or selling the property. I.R.C.
§ 7426(b)(1).
20. I.R.C. § 6334. State law, however, does control whether a taxpayer has property or
rights to property to which a federal tax lien relates. See Aquilino v. United States, 363 U.S.
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Unlike most other creditors, the IRS, with limited
exceptions21 and subject to applicable statutes of limitation,22 may
provisionally collect taxes without recourse to the courts; the
agency alone determines when and how to collect an outstanding
tax. Over time, Congress has increasingly provided taxpayers
with rights to appeal informally to the IRS Appeals Office initial
IRS rejections of those taxpayer-generated collection requests,23

509, 512–16 (1960) (remanding case to state court of appeals to determine whether state law
created a property interest in taxpayer). However, recent Supreme Court decisions have
emphasized the importance of federal law in determining the contours of the IRS’s collection
powers. E.g., Drye v. United States, 528 U.S. 49, 58 (1999) (determining that a court looks to
state law only for the initial inquiry into what rights a taxpayer has in particular property);
United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 288 (2002) (relying on Drye and holding that, although
Michigan law provides that property held by tenants in entirety cannot be reached by
separate creditors, the IRS cannot be bound by such a state provision). For more on Craft
and Drye, see Steve Johnson, After Craft: Implementation Issues, 96 TAX NOTES 553 (2002)
[hereinafter Johnson, After Craft].
21. Before obtaining a final judgment, most other creditors, following the sending of a
“dunning” letter, may seek prejudgment collection action such as prejudgment attachment
or garnishment. SALTZMAN, supra note 11, ¶ 14.01[1]. Although these prejudgment remedies
were once available to creditors through the use of summary ex parte procedures, procedural
due process now generally requires that debtors be given preseizure notice and hearing. For
more on the differences between the IRS and other creditors, see id. (discussing a series of
Supreme Court cases that generally afforded debtors predeprivation notice and hearing
rights before the taking of provisional collection action). See, e.g., N. Geo. Finishing, Inc. v.
Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 605–08 (1975) (invalidating prejudgment garnishment of a
bank account without a provision for early hearing); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp. of Bay
View, 395 U.S. 337, 342 (1969) (striking down a Wisconsin statute that permitted
prejudgment wage garnishment without notice or prior hearing to the wage earner). But see
Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 610, 618–20 (1974) (upholding a Louisiana
sequestration statute).
The most significant limitation on the Service’s broad collection powers pertains to
limitations on the IRS’s ability to enter private residences to seize assets. See G.M. Leasing
Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 358–59 (1977) (requiring the Service to get a warrant
before entering a private office to seize assets). For a discussion of G.M. Leasing and its
implications in the collection process, see Camp, supra note 5, at 28–31.
Moreover, as of RRA 98’s passage, the IRS is limited when exercising its
administrative collection powers on a taxpayer’s principal residence. Prior to RRA 98, the
IRS could seize a principal residence with internal management approval. Under § 6334(e),
as amended by RRA § 3445(b), the IRS must get approval in writing from a federal district
court judge or magistrate prior to levy of a taxpayer’s principal residence. I.R.C. § 6334(e).
For more relating to collection with respect to a residence, see United States v. Rodgers, 461
U.S. 677, 690–99 (1983) (holding that the IRS may use administrative collection procedures
to order the sale of a family home in which a delinquent taxpayer had an interest at the time
the tax liability was incurred but in which the taxpayer’s spouse, who did not owe any of the
indebtedness, had a separate state homestead right).
22. I.R.C. § 6502(a) (providing that the IRS may collect by levy or by judicial
proceeding within ten years after the assessment of tax).
23. I.R.C. §§ 6159(d) and 7122(d), which were added by RRA 98, provide for
administrative review of IRS termination of installment agreements and of OICs. I.R.C.
§ 6326, added by the Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647,
§ 6238(a), 102 Stat. 3342, 3743 (1988), allows administrative appeal of the filing of a notice
of federal tax lien. These statutory rights essentially codified prior administrative practice.

10412-TEXT.NATIVE.1105543696

2004]

1/12/2005 7:28 AM

THE COLLECTION DUE PROCESS RIGHTS

1155

24
but this review is itself not subject to judicial review. Congress
has exempted most IRS decisions regarding the manner in which
the sovereign collects taxes; statutes like the Anti-Injunction
Act25 and the Declaratory Judgment Act,26 for example, prevent
taxpayers from seeking prepayment judicial recourse to review
IRS collection decisions.27
Notwithstanding these broad powers, the Internal Revenue
Code and internal IRS guidelines allow taxpayers to request
specific types of relief from the IRS when faced with threats of
enforced collection, such as a levy or the filing of a notice of
federal tax lien. These relief options, or alternatives to enforced
collection—“collection alternatives” in tax parlance—have grown
increasingly popular, and the IRS is subject to statutory and

24. See, e.g., Olsen v. United States, 326 F. Supp. 2d 184, 188 & n.2 (D. Mass. 2004)
(noting that challenges to rejections of taxpayers’ offers of compromise are entitled only to
“administrative . . . not judicial review”).
25. The Anti-Injunction Act is found at I.R.C. § 7421, which provides,
Except as provided in sections 6015(e), 6212(a) and (c), 6213(a), 6225(b),
6246(b), 6330(e)(1), 6331(i), 6672(c), 6694(c), and 7426(a) and (b)(1), 7429(b), and
7436, no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax
shall be maintained in any court by any person, whether or not such person is the
person against whom such tax was assessed.
I.R.C. § 7421. For more on the limited statutory exemptions to the Anti-Injunction Act,
including those that arise if the IRS fails to send a notice of deficiency or if the IRS begins
collection proceedings before the ninety-day period for responding to a notice of deficiency
under § 6213(a) has passed, see Arthur W. Andrews, The Use of the Injunction as a Remedy
for an Invalid Federal Tax Assessment, 40 TAX L. REV. 653, 653–55 & n.9 (1985). The
Supreme Court has held that a district court may grant an injunction restraining the
assessment or collection of tax if (1) at the time of the suit and taking into consideration the
most liberal view of the law and facts, the government under no circumstances could prevail,
and (2) equity jurisdiction otherwise exists. See Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 737,
748–49 (1974) (denying injunctive relief to university because it could not show that the
government could not prevail); Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1, 7
(1962) (setting forth the rule that tax collection may be enjoined if “it is clear that under no
circumstances could the Government ultimately prevail” and “if equity jurisdiction
otherwise exists”); Miller v. Standard Nut Margarine Co., 284 U.S. 498, 510–11 (1932)
(enjoining collection of a tax on oleomargarine because the item in question did not fall
within the statutory definition of oleomargarine and collection of the tax would destroy the
taxpayer financially). This exception “leaves the granting of an injunction to the rare case.”
SALTZMAN, supra note 11, ¶ 106[4][a], at 1-62.
26. 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2000) (exempting federal tax controversies from the types of
actions allowed to be brought in a declaratory judgment action in federal district court). For
a general explanation of declaratory judgments in the federal tax context, see SALTZMAN,
supra note 11, ¶ 15.05[1].
27. The Anti-Injunction Act has generally prevented courts from reviewing IRS
decisions to accept or reject alternatives to enforced collection or IRS considerations
involving the manner in which the IRS collects taxes. See, e.g., Carroll v. IRS, 14 A.F.T.R.2d.
5564, 5564 (E.D.N.Y. 1964) (concluding that the Anti-Injunction Act prevented the Tax
Court from compelling the Government to accept an offer in compromise). For a discussion of
the interplay of sovereign immunity, the Anti-Injunction Act, and the Declaratory Judgment
Act, see Litig. Guideline Mem. GL-52 (June 28, 1991), 1991 IRS LGM LEXIS 24.
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regulatory standards that it must apply when evaluating them.
These collection alternatives present a number of different
options with varying consequences, including requests that the
IRS defer collection activities due to the taxpayer’s poor financial
circumstances;29 that the IRS accept a compromise of a tax
30
liability, also known as an offer in compromise; or that the
taxpayer pay the agreed upon liability over a period of time, also
known as an installment agreement.31
2. CDP’s Changes to the Administration of Tax Collection.
By allowing taxpayers the right to administrative and judicial
review of collection actions, and concomitantly requiring the IRS
to explain and justify its collection actions, CDP fundamentally
changes the above landscape.32 Following an IRS filing of a notice
of federal tax lien or a levy upon certain assets, CDP requires the
IRS to notify taxpayers of their right to a hearing before the IRS

28. For a summary of these rules, see 5 INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL PART V
COLLECTION
PROCESS
(((DATE)))
[hereinafter
IRS
MANUAL
PART
V],
http://www.irs.gov/irm/part5/index.html.
29. See id. § 5.16.1.1 (Currently Not Collectible: Overview). For example, the taxpayer
can request to be placed in uncollectible status if the taxpayer can establish that payment of
any amount due would constitute an economic hardship. Id. §§ 5.16.1.1, 5.16.1.2.9.
Establishing hardship can also result in the IRS releasing a levy. See I.R.C. § 6343(a)(1)(D).
Economic hardship is established by considering the taxpayer’s income and expenses, with
the IRS providing that only certain expenses will be relevant, such as food, clothing, medical
costs, transportation, and housing. See Treas. Reg. § 301.6343-1(b)(4) (2004). The IRS also
publishes national and local expense allowance guidelines to help it evaluate the taxpayer’s
ability to pay a delinquent tax liability. See IRS, Collection Financial Standards, IRS.gov, at
http://www.irs.gov/individuals/article/0,,id=96543,00.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2004).
30. See I.R.C. § 7122; Treas. Reg. § 301.7122-1(b)(2). The IRS considers acceptance
primarily because there is doubt as to collectibility of the full amount of tax, interest, and
penalties. The IRS evaluates the offer based upon the taxpayer’s expected ability to pay the
tax out of net equity in assets and the excess of income over otherwise allowable expenses
(determined largely on the basis of the guidelines referred to in note 28 supra). If the
taxpayer’s offer exceeds what the IRS believes to be the taxpayer’s reasonable collection
potential (RCP), it is authorized to accept the offer. The IRS may also accept an offer that is
less than a taxpayer’s RCP in situations in which collection would create economic hardship
or in which compelling public policy or equity considerations justify acceptance. See Treas.
Reg. § 301.7122-1(b)(2), (b)(3), (c)(1). If there is a question about the existence or amount of
the liability itself, the IRS may also compromise the liability. See Treas. Reg. § 301.71221(b)(1); see also INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL PART V, supra note 28, § 5.8.1 (Offers in
Compromise: Overview).
31. See I.R.C. § 6159; INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, supra note 28, § 5.14.1.1
(Securing Installment Agreements: Overview).
Other collection alternatives include a taxpayer request that the IRS withdraw the
filing of its notice of federal tax lien to facilitate future payment, the posting of a bond, and a
substitution of other assets for payment of the liability. See Treas. Reg. § 301.6330-1(e)(3)
Q&A-E6.
32. See Diane L. Fahey, The Tax Court’s Jurisdiction Over Due Process Collection
Appeals: Is It Constitutional?, 55 BAYLOR L. REV. 453, 464 (2003) (calling CDP’s judicial
review of tax collection a “dramatic departure” from past practice).
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Appeals Office. At this hearing, a taxpayer may request that the
Appeals Officer (AO) consider whether the IRS’s collection
decision (i.e., the levy or filed notice of federal tax lien) was
inappropriate.34 Specifically, CDP requires the AO to verify that
the IRS followed administrative and procedural requirements
(the “verification requirement”)35 and to consider whether the
“collection action balances the need for the efficient collection of
taxes with the legitimate concern of the [taxpayer] that [the]
collection action be no more intrusive than necessary” (the
“balancing requirement”).36 In addition, at the CDP conference, if
a taxpayer requests a collection alternative (such as an offer in
compromise) that the IRS rejects, the AO, independently of IRS
collection personnel, must consider the merits of the taxpayer’s
request for a collection alternative (the “collection alternative
requirement”).37
Following the hearing, the AO is supposed to issue a written
notice of determination summarizing her conclusions regarding
the verification and balancing requirements.38 In addition, if the
taxpayer has requested a collection alternative, the notice of

33. I.R.C. § 6320.
34. See I.R.C. §§ 6320(c), 6330(c)(2)(A)(ii). The collection action might not be
appropriate because collection might relate to taxes that were discharged in a prior
bankruptcy proceeding or because the taxpayer might be able to establish that the IRS
should declare him administratively not collectible. See IRS, CHIEF COUNSEL NOTICE, CC2003-016, at 15 (May 29, 2003) [hereinafter CDP NOTICE].
Collection action might also be inappropriate if the taxpayer does not owe the
underlying liability, but challenges to the underlying liability are only allowed in a CDP
hearing if the taxpayer “did not receive any statutory notice of deficiency . . . or did not
otherwise have an opportunity to dispute [the] liability.” I.R.C. § 6330(c)(2)(B); see also CDP
NOTICE, supra, at 15–16. At CDP hearings, taxpayers may also raise spousal defenses to
seek relief from the underlying liability under I.R.C. §§ 66 and 6015, barring a previous IRS
final determination on the merits of such a request or a prior final judicial proceeding. I.R.C.
§ 6330(c)(2)(A)(i); Treas. Reg. §§ 301.6330-1(e)(2), 301.6330-1(3)(3) Q&A-E3, E8. Although
taxpayers have raised these noncollection issues in CDP hearings, collection activities
comprise the major part of CDP cases, and this Article focuses largely on CDP’s provisions
concerning the propriety of IRS collection actions and consideration of alternatives to
immediate payment of a tax liability. See DEP’T OF TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF
ADMINISTRATION’S FISCAL YEAR 2004 REVENUE PROPOSALS 91 (2003) (acknowledging that
most CDP cases involve collection issues rather than questions pertaining to the underlying
liability or spousal defenses). As discussed below in Part IV.A, I believe these rights to raise
noncollection matters in CDP hearings actually weaken the protections most essential in
CDP cases and allow a mechanism for inappropriate cases to work their way through IRS
Appeals and the courts. For a discussion of the potential constitutional problems associated
with giving the Tax Court the power to consider the underlying liability in CDP cases, see
Fahey, supra note 32, at 486–88.
35. I.R.C. § 6330(c)(1).
36. I.R.C. § 6330(c)(3)(c).
37. Treas. Reg. § 301.7122-1(f)(5).
38. Treas. Reg. § 301.6330-1(e)(3) Q&A-E8.
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39
determination will contain the AO’s view on that request. The
taxpayer may contest the AO’s determination by filing an appeal
to either the Tax Court or a federal district court within thirty
days, depending upon the tax in question.40 During the pendency
of the hearing, and often throughout appeal, the IRS collection
action is stayed.41
In sum, CDP departs from past practice in two principal
ways: (1) it provides the taxpayer with statutorily significant
administrative and judicial review of certain IRS collection
determinations, and (2) it provides taxpayers with an effective
unilateral right to enjoin collection during the pendency of those
hearings.

B. CDP’s Background
CDP arose out of the broader tax reform of 1998 and is
consistent with Congress’s desire at that time to interpose
external checks on the agency’s nearly unlimited collection
discretion.42 Although the IRS still enjoys broad collection
powers, in RRA 98 Congress sought to bring IRS powers more in
line with other creditors’:
The Committee believes that taxpayers are entitled to
protections in dealing with the IRS that are similar to those
they would have in dealing with any other creditor.
Accordingly, the Committee believes that the IRS should
afford taxpayers adequate notice of collection activity and a

39. If a taxpayer has raised questions concerning the underlying liability or the
availability of spousal defenses, the written determination is supposed to address those as
well. See id.
40. The appeal of a determination is filed with the Tax Court only if the Tax Court has
jurisdiction over the type of tax specified in the CDP Notice. See Moore v. Comm’r, 114 T.C.
171, 175 (2000) (interpreting “section 6330(d)(1)(A) and (B) together to mean that Congress
did not intend to expand the Court’s jurisdiction beyond the types of taxes that the Court
may normally consider”). If the Tax Court does not have jurisdiction, the appeal must be
filed with the appropriate U.S. district court. See Treas. Reg. § 301.6330-1(f)(2) Q&A-F3.
41. I.R.C. § 6330(e). A court may permit levy actions if the underlying liability is not
at issue and the IRS shows good cause. I.R.C. § 6330(e)(2).
42. See Camp, supra note 5, at 87–91 (describing RRA 98 in detail and noting the
difference between recent reform and IRS reform in the 1950s). Professor Camp notes that
in the recent IRS reform, anecdotal evidence led to outrage over Service employees’ actions,
prompting the enactment of external checks on the Service, whereas in the 1950s the
resulting legislation focused on the addition of internal checks and balances within the IRS.
Id. at 87–88. For an excellent review of other periods of IRS reform and the contrast in
emphasis on internal checks in IRS discretion during many of those reform movements, see
Joseph J. Thorndike, Reforming the Internal Revenue Service: A Comparative History, 53
ADMIN. L. REV. 717 (2001) (discussing in great detail the four main overhauls of the IRS
(and its predecessor the Bureau of Internal Revenue), in 1866–1870, 1920–1926, 1952–1954,
and 1997–1998).
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meaningful hearing before the IRS deprives them of their
43
property.

The CDP proposals grew, in part, out of testimony at Senate
Finance Committee hearings from four respected members of the
tax community, including current National Taxpayer Advocate
Nina Olson and tax procedure expert Michael Saltzman, who
testified about the need to introduce a third party to protect both
the government’s and the taxpayers’ rights in the tax collection
process.44 Initial CDP proposals were broader than those
eventually enacted—for example, the original CDP proposal
would have given all taxpayers the right to challenge the amount
or existence of a liability in CDP hearings and would have
granted taxpayers the right to a CDP hearing before the filing of
a notice of federal tax lien, rather than a postfiling right.45
Government officials in the Clinton Administration objected to
CDP on policy grounds and were wary of CDP’s impact on the
IRS’s ability to collect taxes:
This [CDP] provision represents an overreaction to
allegations of IRS overreaching in connection with the
collection of taxes. The proposed process would permit the
noncompliant taxpayer to benefit at the expense of the vast
majority of taxpayers who report and pay their taxes
timely. In essence, this legislation would give any taxpayer
a unilateral right to enjoin collection of taxes simply by
taking an appeal to the Office of Appeals and then seeking
Tax Court review.
....
. . . Our experience is that if the IRS is unable to freeze
assets of a taxpayer such as bank accounts, accounts
receivable, stocks or securities, and motor vehicles, the
assets will often quickly disappear and the IRS will be
relegated at best to its remedies under fraudulent transfer
law. For that reason, the proposed due process protections
may dramatically affect the ability of the IRS to collect
taxes, unless the rights of the IRS in the taxpayer’s
property are frozen prior to any availability of
46
administrative and judicial review.

43. S. REP. NO. 105-174, at 67 (1998).
44. IRS Restructuring: Hearings on H.R. 2676 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance,
105th Cong. 124–28 (1998) (statements of Nina Olson and Michael Saltzman). The
legislative history is summarized in 2003 REPORT, supra note 3, at 38–39.
45. S. REP. NO. 105-174, at 67–68.
46. Letter from L. Anthony Sutin, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Justice
Department, to The Honorable William V. Roth, Jr., Chairman, Committee on Finance, U.S.
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Thus, when Congress was considering CDP, there was a
tension between efficiency and fidelity to rule of law. Critics of
CDP believed that it would hamper IRS efforts to collect taxes,
but its supporters believed that interposing additional notice and
hearing requirements would place needed external controls on
agency power. Although there is a lack of compelling evidence
that CDP is materially affecting the IRS’s ability to collect
taxes,47 CDP has dramatically reshuffled administrative and
judicial resource allocations towards collection cases.48 This major
tilt in administrative and judicial focus clarifies whether
Congress calibrated taxpayer protections appropriately. The
following Part of the Article considers CDP in light of
administrative and constitutional law principles and provides
insight into an appropriate view of CDP’s merits.
III. TAX ADJUDICATIONS: THE CONTEXT OF ADMINISTRATIVE AND
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
A. Introduction: The Rule of Law and Its Absence in Tax
Collection
The last decades of the twentieth century coincided with an
intense judicial focus on the role of law in the modern
administrative state, largely through the lenses of constitutional
procedural
due
process49
and
administrative
law.50
Notwithstanding the tax system’s ubiquity as a government area
that touches almost all Americans’ lives,51 academics and
Senate, and The Honorable Bill Archer, Chairman, Committee on Ways and Means, House
of Representatives, paras. 20–21 (June 8, 1998), reprinted in L. Anthony Sutin, Justice
Letter Raising Constitutional Concerns in IRS Reform, TAX NEWS TODAY, June 11, 1998,
LEXIS, 98 TNT 112–41.
47. Cf. Johnson, After Craft, supra note 20, at 1022–23 (noting a drastic decline in
enforced collection revenue following enactment of RRA 98 and observing that collection
actions, like the filing of notices of federal tax liens and levy or seizure actions, have been
recently increasing following sharp post-RRA 98 declines).
48. Id. at 1043 (commenting that CDP consumes “large amounts” of judicial and
administrative resources); see also 2003 REPORT, supra note 3, at 50 (reviewing the
“dramatic” rise in collection cases from fourteen percent of case receipts in FY 1997 to over
fifty percent in FY 2003 and noting that CDP comprises a majority of current collection
cases). For more on the significant administrative and judicial resources CDP implicates, see
Cords, supra note 5 (manuscript at 9–10 & n.50) (discussing the growing number of CDP
requests).
49. See JERRY L. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 10–12 (1985)
(discussing the pervasiveness of constitutional law due process challenges to myriad forms of
agency adjudications in the late twentieth century).
50. See, e.g., Harold H. Bruff, Specialized Courts in Administrative Law, 43 ADMIN. L.
REV. 329, 346–47 (1991) (discussing the relationship of constitutional law to agency practice).
51. In addition to raising revenues through exclusions, deductions, and credits, tax
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policymakers have often viewed tax law as an island, apart from
the procedural and substantive legal mainstream.52 Perhaps
because taxing powers, unlike other agency practices,53 are so
essential to our government, administrative and constitutional
law scholarship has had little impact on IRS adjudication54
practices.55

provisions provide numerous indirect benefits that affect and influence many facets of taxpayer
behavior. Professor Stanley Surrey popularized the term “tax expenditure,” which
encompasses those items that seem like government payments to certain groups of taxpayers.
See STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM: THE CONCEPT OF TAX EXPENDITURES, at
vii (1973) (providing an introduction to the concept of tax expenditures). Tax expenditures
serve to make an already complex body of tax laws even more complex. See Samuel A.
Donaldson, The Easy Case Against Tax Simplification, 22 VA. TAX REV. 645, 656 (2003)
(explaining that tax expenditure provisions contradict fundamental tax policy and make the
Code much more difficult for taxpayers to understand and for the IRS to enforce).
52. See, e.g., Paul L. Caron, Tax Myopia, or Mamas Don’t Let Your Babies Grow Up to be
Tax Lawyers, 13 VA. TAX REV. 517, 519, 524–27, 531 (1994) (asserting that tax lawyers’
isolation from other lawyers perpetuates the myth that tax law is different from other areas of
law); Michael A. Livingston, Reinventing Tax Scholarship: Lawyers, Economists, and the Role
of the Legal Academy, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 365, 384–85, 387 (1998) (noting that tax law is an
isolated discipline and positing that tax scholarship would benefit by reaching into nontax law
as well as nonlegal fields). See also generally Leandra Lederman, “Civil”izing Tax Procedure:
Applying General Federal Learning to Statutory Notices of Deficiency, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
183 (1996) [hereinafter Lederman, “Civil”izing] (stating that both substantive tax law and tax
procedure tend to be uninformed by other areas of law).
53. For example, there is an extensive literature concerning the review of Social Security
Administration disability determinations. See Paul R. Verkuil & Jeffrey S. Lubbers,
Alternative Approaches to Judicial Review of Social Security Disability Cases, 55 ADMIN. L.
REV. 731, 733, 773–76 (2003) (reviewing a number of proposals to change the current district
court review of Social Security cases to achieve fairer and more uniform decisionmaking).
Likewise, there is significant scholarship concerning the review of Veterans’ Administration
disability determinations. Id. at 762–71 (discussing the current veterans’ benefits appeals
process). For competing views of the appeals process in Veterans Administration hearings,
compare James T. O’Reilly, Burying Caesar: Replacement of the Veterans Appeals Process Is
Needed to Provide Fairness to Claimants, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 223, 227 (2001) (deploring the
slowness of the current system), with Gary E. O’Conner, Rendering to Caesar: A Response to
Professor O’Reilly, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 343, 345 (arguing that the ponderousness of the system
may, in fact, be justified). Prior to 1988, these determinations were not subject to judicial
review. See WILLIAM F. FOX, JR., THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR VETERANS’
CLAIMS 5 (2d ed. 1998).
54. For the purposes of this Article, adjudication is defined as an IRS determination
with respect to a tax liability or credit eligibility of a specific taxpayer, including decisions
regarding enforced collection and taxpayer requests for collection alternatives. In
administrative law parlance, agency action is generally divided between adjudication and
rulemaking, with the latter detailing agency action pertaining to “the whole or a part of an
agency statement of general or particular applicability and future effect,” and the former
referring to the “agency process for the formulation of an order.” 5 U.S.C. § 551(4), (7) (2000 &
Supp. 2003). The APA defines an order as “the whole or a part of [an agency’s] final
disposition.” § 551(6).
55. To be sure, constitutional law, and procedural due process in particular, provides
only a limited check on minimally acceptable agency procedures. See, e.g., Bruff, supra note 50,
at 347 (discussing the relationship between administrative law and constitutional law due
process jurisprudence in administrative adjudicative procedures). As Professor Bruff explains,
“most administrative adjudication is not very vulnerable to constitutional invalidation under
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The justification for this lack of scrutiny has largely centered
around the conclusory importance rather bluntly attached to the
government’s receipt of tax dollars and how a potentially hostile
judiciary or the imposition of additional procedures could put
sand in the gears of government machinery.56 The government
interest in tax collection, although vital, involves subtle
considerations, including the potential of alternatives to full
payment to increase the amount of tax the government actually
collects57 and the possibility that increasing postassessment
procedural protections may embolden noncompliance or,
alternatively, increase compliance through a greater sense of
public confidence in the fairness of procedures.58 An
understanding of these subtleties, as well as an appreciation of
individuals’ interests in the tax collection process, assists the
progression of this Article’s normative argument: CDP’s
administrative hearings and judicial review of those IRS
collection hearings are not necessarily unwarranted, wasteful, or
dangerous to the very existence of our government; rather, they
comprise a step in the progression of the rule of law principles
that came to permeate twentieth century legal culture.59

the due process clause.” Id.; refer also to note 80 infra and accompanying text (commenting
that constitutional law has even less impact on IRS adjudication because of the longstanding
belief that it is unwise to interpose additional procedures that might delay the receipt of tax
revenues). Nonetheless, the modern due process balancing analysis provides insight into how
agencies should set procedural safeguards.
56. See Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247, 259 (1935) (explaining that “taxes are
the life-blood of government, and their prompt and certain availability an imperious
need”). In an oft-quoted passage, Justice Roberts explains the historical imperative for the
sovereign’s use of summary collection procedures: “Time out of mind, therefore, the
sovereign has resorted to more drastic means of collection. The assessment is given the
force of a judgment, and if the amount assessed is not paid when due, administrative
officials may seize the debtor’s property to satisfy the debt.” Id. at 259–60.
57. See INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL (CCH) § 5.8.1.1.4, at 16,254 (((DATE)))
(acknowledging that offers “effect collection of what can reasonably be collected at the
earliest possible time and at the least cost to the government”).
58. See Leandra Lederman, The Interplay Between Norms and Enforcement in Tax
Compliance, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1453, 1487 n.190 (2003) [hereinafter Lederman, Tax
Compliance] (positing, for example, that “the offer-in-compromise program may
undermine taxpayer assurance that others are paying their tax obligations by letting
taxpayers who legally owe taxes compromise those obligations for a small fraction of the
liability”). For more on the importance of process in ensuring the legitimacy of
government actions, see Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, Public Law and Legal
Theory Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 04-02, at 6–8, at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=508282 (Spring 2004) (explaining that “the action-guiding role of
procedure is important because it undermines [the assumption of a split between
procedural law and substantive law] implicit in the ex post view of procedural fairness”).
59. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, TOTAL JUSTICE 80–91 (1985) (arguing that
Americans increasingly expect all government actions that affect individuals to conform
to notions of fair procedure).
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Although the extent of external constraints on agency
discretion generally varies with the nature of the decision and
the type of interest involved, external constraints—such as the
APA’s general scheme of judicial review of agency adjudication
and procedural due process’s general requirements for notice and
hearing prior to the deprivation of a property, liberty, or privacy
interest—help ensure that government actors comply with the
law.60 The concept of rule of law relates to a model of regularity
and incorporates, through the requirement of fair procedures, a
61
means to achieve that regularity. Although the exact definition
of the rule of law varies somewhat among scholars, there are
fundamental procedural principles underlying many scholars’
approaches to the subject, including the notion that it is
important to minimize governmental arbitrariness and
unfettered discretion and the notion that there should be equal
treatment for all those who come before the law.62
In the tax collection process, Congress and the Supreme
Court have exempted the IRS from procedural regularity and
external checks on agency discretion, both of which are
associated with rule of law principles.63 Faced with the possibility
that third parties would interfere with tax collection, Congress,
when crafting administrative law-type checks on IRS practice,
and the Supreme Court, when considering the role that
constitutional law should have in the tax adjudication process,
have given the IRS almost absolute discretion in collecting taxes

60. Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Government Benefits and the Rule of Law:
Toward a Standards-Based Theory of Due Process, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2005)
(manuscript at 4, 30–31) (explaining that due process and separation of powers rule of law
principles
require
standards
for
administrative
discretion),
available
at
http://ssrn.com/abstract59283.
61. Id. at 11.
62. See, e.g., Jennifer C. Root, The Commissioner’s Clear Reflection of Income Power
Under § 446(B) and the Abuse of Discretion Standard of Review: Where Has the Rule of
Law Gone, and Can We Get It Back?, 15 AKRON TAX J. 69, 71–72 (2000) (citing A.V.
DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION (7th ed. 1908))
(describing the fundamental characteristics of the rule of law). The importance of this
fundamental rule of law principles has likely contributed to popular dissatisfaction with
IRS collection procedures, which largely operate within IRS revenue officers’ broad
discretion. For example, Professor Lawrence Friedman notes that Americans increasingly
have a general expectation of justice that includes a strong sense of procedural regularity
in public and private affairs. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 59, at 5. IRS practices are
therefore in sharp contrast with many Americans’ interactions with other public and
private actors.
63. Professor Bryan Camp refers to tax administration’s lack of external oversight
as consistent with tax administration’s pedigree as part of an inquisitorial, rather than an
adversarial, process. Camp, supra note 5, at 16 (citing Bolich v. Rubel, 67 F.2d 894, 895
(2d Cir. 1933)).
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and considering the merits of taxpayer requests for collection
alternatives.64
B. IRS Adjudicatory Determinations: The IRS as an
Administrative Agency
1. Tax Adjudications’ Place Outside the Administrative
Law Mainstream. Modern administrative law takes its shape
from the 1946 passage of the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA).65 The APA provides for strict trial-like procedures for socalled
formal
adjudications
and
limited
procedural
requirements for so-called informal adjudications.66 For formal
64. Although Congress and the Court have based this absolute discretion on too
generous a perception of the government’s interest in the tax process and too little
consideration of the individual’s interest or rights, the discretion is even harder to justify
in the face of agency actions relating to the dispensation of benefits wherein IRS decisions
can make the difference between a taxpayer’s living below or above poverty levels. This
point is more direct when considering IRS collection actions to recover refundable credits,
like the earned income tax credit (EITC), which are meant to supplement low wage work
and constitute a fundamental part of the nation’s antipoverty policy. See, e.g., Francine J.
Lipman, The Working Poor Are Paying For Government Benefits: Fixing the Hole in the
Anti-Poverty Purse, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 461, 462 (noting that the EITC lifts 4.3 million
households out of poverty); Diane Lim Rogers & Alan Weil, Welfare Reform and the Role
of Tax Policy, 53 NAT’L TAX J. 385, 391 (2000) (noting that the importance of targeted tax
credits in terms of overall federal policy to help lower-income Americans is often
overlooked). “A common perception is that tax policy primarily affects high-income
families, while transfer policy is used to redistribute resources to the lower-income
population. That is too simplistic a view,” as the tax system is increasingly the vehicle for
federal transfers to low-income populations. Id. at 391.
It is also appropriate to consider that IRS decisions regarding collection
alternatives provide important taxpayer benefits. Administrative law scholars often
define government benefits as a relief from costs or burdens:
We use the term “government benefits” to describe a broad spectrum of benefits,
including welfare and social security, public employment and government
contracts, and occupational licenses or building permits. Their common feature
is that they are benefits (including in principle relief from costs or burdens) that
private persons receive from the government.
Shapiro & Levy, supra note 60, at 2 n.1. As such, IRS decisions with respect to collection
alternatives, which provide certain taxpayers with relief from the burden of full payment
of a liability or enforced collection, though perhaps not implicating as important an
interest as direct tax expenditures such as the EITC, nonetheless often have great
financial impact on taxpayers.
65. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551 et seq. (2000 & Supp. 2003).
66. Edward Rubin, It’s Time to Make the Administrative Procedure Act
Administrative, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 95, 108 (2003) (noting that the APA “imposes few, if
any, requirements on informal adjudication”). The APA also divides agency action into
two general administrative categories, rulemaking and adjudication. Robert L. Rabin,
Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1265 (1986). Like
adjudication, rulemaking is further bifurcated into formal and informal proceedings.
Formal rulemaking calls for “trial-type” hearings, and informal rulemaking provides for
“a system of antecedent publicity” through notice and comment periods. See BERNARD
SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW §§ 4.9–.10 (2d ed. 1984).
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adjudications, the APA provides detailed procedural safeguards,
including the right to be heard before an administrative law
judge and formal trial-like protections, such as requirements
that an agency only consider evidence properly admitted and
subject to rebuttal and that an agency explain its decisions in a
manner similar to the way trial courts explain themselves.67
Over time, due to the costs associated with the strict triallike procedures associated with formal adjudications, courts
have limited the types of agency actions subject to formal
68
adjudications. At the time of the APA’s passage, Congress
exempted IRS deficiency adjudications from the APA’s onerous
formal adjudication requirements because the agency
determinations regarding tax deficiencies were already subject
to subsequent trial de novo issues of both fact and law in Tax
Court, thus providing taxpayers with the type of judicially
guaranteed protections that were attendant in the APA’s
extensive formal adjudication procedures.69
A significant amount of scholarship has considered both the APA’s application to
the IRS’s rulemaking function and the deference that courts should give to various forms
of IRS and Treasury rulemaking guidance. See, e.g., John F. Coverdale, Chevron’s
Reduced Domain: Judicial Review of Treasury Regulations and Revenue Rulings After
Mead, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 39, 72–74 (2003) (discussing the APA’s application to various
forms of Treasury and IRS guidance and addressing the degree of deference courts should
afford to tax law interpretations); John F. Coverdale, Court Review of Tax Regulations
and Revenue Rulings in the Chevron Era, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 35 (1995) (same); Linda
Galler, Emerging Standards for Judicial Review of IRS Revenue Rulings, 72 B.U. L. REV.
841, 844 (1992) (arguing that heightened deference should not apply to statutory
interpretations in certain IRS administrative pronouncements).
67. Gordon G. Young, Judicial Review of Informal Agency Action on the Fiftieth
Anniversary of the APA: The Alleged Demise and Actual Status of Overton Park’s
Requirement of Judicial Review “On the Record”, 10 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 179, 194–95
(1996).
68. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556–557; Young, supra note 67, at 194 & n.58 (describing
formal adjudication as a “relatively rare, procedurally onerous method of agency
decisionmaking” that only applies if an enabling statute specifically “requires the agency
action to be made ‘on the record’”).
In reviewing agency decisions through formal adjudication processes, courts must
examine an agency’s entire record and, to uphold the agency’s decision, must find that
“substantial evidence” taking that record as a whole supports an agency’s action. See
§ 706(2)(E); see also Ronald F. Wright, Sentencers, Bureaucrats, and the Administrative
Law Perspective on the Federal Sentencing Commission, 79 CAL. L. REV. 1, 56 (1991).
69. STAFF OF SENATE JUDICIARY COMM., 79TH CONG., ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
ACT 23 (Comm. Print 1945) (providing explanations of the provisions of the
Administrative Procedure Act) (“The exception of matters subject to a subsequent trial of
the law and the facts de novo in any court exempts such matters as the tax functions of
the Bureau of Internal Revenue (which are triable de novo in The Tax Court) . . . .”); see
also SALTZMAN, supra note 11, ¶ 1.06[2], at 1-54 (explaining that APA adjudication rules
do not apply to IRS administrative hearings); Mary Ferrari, “Was Blind, but Now I See”
(Or What’s Behind the Notice of Deficiency and Why Won’t the Tax Court Look?), 55 ALB.
L. REV. 407, 423–24 (1991) (noting that the APA is not applicable to the return
examination process).
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Although some cases acknowledge the APA’s exemption of
tax proceedings from the APA’s formal adjudication rules,70
until recently there was little authority discussing whether IRS
adjudications not subject to de novo review should thus be
treated as informal adjudications under the APA. Because the
APA provides essentially no guidance on what procedures
agencies are required to provide to parties in informal
adjudications, the absence of clear guidance on the treatment of
IRS adjudications not subject to de novo review is not directly
relevant with respect to what procedures the agency applies in
making those decisions; rather, the import of the analysis is
whether the extensive administrative law jurisprudence
surrounding abuse of discretion review (which applies to most
court review of agency informal adjudications) should control
how courts review IRS determinations (like CDP collection
determinations).71
2. A Closer Look at Unreviewability and Discretion. As
mentioned in Part II, prior to CDP, the Anti-Injunction Act and
the Declaratory Judgment Act exempted most IRS collection
determinations from judicial review. These informal agency
decisions covered a broad swath of territory and included
agency determinations to take certain collection actions, like

70. See, e.g., Ewing v. Comm’r, 122 T.C. 32, 52 (2004) (Thornton, J., concurring)
(citing Phillips v. Comm’r, 289 U.S. 589, 598, 600 (1931)) (“[T]his Court’s de novo
procedures for reviewing IRS functions [are] well established and ‘recognized by law’
within the meaning of APA section 559.”); Greenberg’s Express, Inc. v. Comm’r, 62 T.C.
324, 328 (1974) (“[A] trial before the Tax Court is a proceeding de novo; our determination
as to a petitioner’s tax liability must be based on the merits of the case and not any
previous record developed at the administrative level.”).
71. Two factors have blurred the relationship between tax adjudications and the
APA: (1) the history of the Tax Court, until its 1969 change to an Article I court, as an
independent agency within the executive branch and (2) the predominance of IRS
determinations that were subject to de novo review and hence excluded, as a practical
matter, from the APA. See Ewing, 122 T.C. at 52; Fahey, supra note 32, at 481. With the
increased importance of IRS adjudications that are not subject to de novo review but
instead reviewed on an abuse of discretion basis (like collection determinations in CDP
cases), there has been some question about the relationship between IRS adjudications
and traditional administrative law principles. See, e.g., Ewing, 122 T.C. at 53 (concluding
that the APA’s standards applicable to reviews of informal adjudication do not apply to
IRS determinations for equitable relief from joint and several liability, notwithstanding
that court review of those determinations is to be done under an abuse of discretion
standard).
On its face, the APA would arguably appear to apply [to the IRS decision to
revoke a taxpayer ruling]. . . . [D]espite thorough review of numerous decisions
involving retroactive revocation, the Court and the parties have been unable to
find any decision holding that the APA does regulate the scope of review;
apparently no one heretofore has thought to raise the issue.
Pierson v. U.S., 428 F. Supp. 384, 389 (D. Del. 1977) (citation and footnotes omitted).
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deciding to levy or seize assets or to file a notice of federal tax
lien to protect the government’s interest. The IRS decisions
exempted from meaningful judicial review also included
taxpayer requests for collection alternatives—or agency
collection determinations made pursuant to a taxpayer
request—including requests (1) to compromise a tax liability,
(2) to pay a liability in installments, (3) to find that the
taxpayer’s financial circumstances are so dire that the agency
should place the taxpayer in noncollectible status, or (4) to
withdraw a notice of federal tax lien to allow a taxpayer to
secure needed financing.72
In administrative law, judicial unreviewability of final
agency decisions is the exception, rather than the rule.
Professor Koch, in reviewing the limited situations in which
unreviewability is the norm, argues that there should be a “very
strong preference” against unbridled agency discretion and that
“it is at best a necessary evil brought about by such
expediencies as the need to end the process or save resources for
more important decisions.”73 Although the APA provides that
judicial review of agency action does not arise “to the extent
that—(1) [other] statutes [like the Anti-Injunction Act] preclude
judicial review; or (2) agency action is committed to agency
discretion by law,” courts apply both exceptions to judicial
review narrowly.74 For example, courts interpreting the
“committed-to-agency-discretion exception” focus on whether
the statute is drawn so broadly that in any given case there is
no law to apply.75 Moreover, the committed-to-agency-discretion
limitation on the reviewability of agency decisions has been
subject to significant academic criticism. For example, Professor
Ronald Levin has referred to a number of policy reasons to

72. See I.R.C. § 6330(b)-(d) (West 2004) (authorizing tax court to hear appeals
relating to unpaid taxes or impending levies).
73. Charles H. Koch, Jr., Judicial Review of Administrative Discretion, 54 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 469, 502 (1986) [hereinafter Koch, Judicial Review].
74. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1), (2) (2000).
75. Examples of areas in which courts have found no law to apply include military
and foreign affairs, subjects in which unreviewability relates to the political branch’s
significant latitude. For a discussion of those exceptions, see Koch, Judicial Review, supra
note 73, at 499.
In addition, courts have found that certain agency actions to not engage in
enforcement activity are unreviewable. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985).
The “no-law-to-apply test” has generated a substantial amount of scholarship, much of it
emphasizing the importance of a narrow application of the principle. See, e.g., Ronald M.
Levin, Understanding Unreviewability in Administrative Law, 74 MINN. L. REV. 689, 741
(1990) (suggesting a more pragmatic approach to the issue of unreviewability, including
historical, utilitarian, and prudential considerations).
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encourage judicial review of agency action and narrowly
interpret the no-law-to-apply test:
Scrutiny of administrative action by an independent
judiciary is an integral part of the American checks and
balances system—a powerful deterrent to abuses of power
and an effective remedy when abuses occur. By helping
maintain public confidence that government officials
remain subject to the rule of law, judicial review also
bolsters the legitimacy of agency action. . . . Finally, judicial
review can enhance the quality of administrative action by
exposing partiality, carelessness, and perverseness in
76
agencies’ reasoning.
Although the IRS has, at times, invoked the committed-toagency-discretion exception in an attempt to limit judicial review,
courts have applied that exception narrowly to IRS activities,77
and by itself the exception would likely not bar judicial
consideration of collection alternatives.78 Despite the exception’s
narrow reach, because the Anti-Injunction Act and the
Declaratory Judgment Act are, in APA parlance, “other statutes
[that] preclude review,” with limited exceptions,79 IRS decisions

76. See Levin, supra note 75, at 742 (footnote omitted). Writing about the public
rights doctrine, and in particular criticizing its effect on insulating some agency actions
from judicial scrutiny, Professors Shapiro and Levy also point to the importance of
judicial review in ensuring that agency actions do not unfairly impinge upon individuals’
rights. See Shapiro & Levy, supra note 60, at 12–13.
77. See, e.g., Butler v. Comm’r, 114 T.C. 276, 288–89 (2000) (rejecting the IRS’s
argument that review of the equitable relief innocent spouse provision was committed to
agency discretion and not subject to judicial review and referring to the strong
presumption that agency action is subject to review). But see Shanahan v. Voskuil, No. 76
CV 210-W-1, 1977 WL 1333, at *1 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 26, 1977) (concluding that actions to bar
payment of taxes in excess of the amount of taxpayer’s proposed offer in compromise are
prohibited under the Anti-Injunction Act and that IRS decisions with respect to offers in
compromise are committed to agency discretion under APA § 701(a)(2)).
78. For example, in the context of CDP determinations, the Tax Court has now
considered on numerous occasions whether IRS rejections of installment agreements or
offers in compromise constitute an abuse of discretion, and the CDP statute itself
contemplates judicial review of IRS determinations with respect to collection
determinations. See, e.g., Roman v. Comm’r, 87 T.C.M. (CCH) 835, 2004 WL 157817, at *4
(2004) (reviewing a CDP determination that rejected an offer in compromise as a
collection alternative under 26 U.S.C. § 6330(c)(2)(iii) (2000) and finding no abuse of
discretion in the IRS’s decision to reject the offer). Courts have concluded, however, that
they may not have the power to compel acceptance of an offer in compromise. See, e.g.,
Chavez v. United States, No. Civ. EP-03-CA-303(KC), 2004 WL 1124914 (W.D. Tex. May
18, 2004) (holding that the IRS nonprocessable determination regarding the offer in
compromise was an abuse of discretion yet also holding that it did not have the power to
compel acceptance of the offer).
79. There is some limited recourse for improper IRS conduct in collection cases, as
taxpayers can seek money damages for improper collection actions, I.R.C. § 7430 (West
2004); and IRS employees can be discharged for improper conduct in connection with the
collection of taxes, I.R.C. § 7804; RRA 98 § 1203.
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regarding the manner in which the sovereign collects taxes have
been largely exempt from judicial review.80 Thus, taxpayers
disgruntled with those decisions have not even benefited from
the possibility of some redemption through judicial review of
improper agency action.
Little academic writing has focused on the possible adverse
effects of the Anti-Injunction Act or the Declaratory Judgment
Act on IRS practice, especially with respect to collection
determinations, but the benefits that administrative law scholars
have identified as being associated with limiting the reach of the
APA’s nonreviewability provisions apply to tax collection cases.
As Professor Levin notes in other contexts, judicial review of
collection action is likely to deter IRS abuses, provide a taxpayer
remedy when the IRS abuses its formidable collection powers,
provide legitimacy to IRS action through increased public
confidence, enhance the quality of agency practice, and provide
additional guarantees that the IRS will protect individual rights
in the collection process.81
3. The Recurring Tension Between Efficiency and the Rule
of Law. The above tour through the outlines of administrative
law reveals competing and often contradictory concerns within
administrative law. Competing policy concerns underlie the
review of agency adjudication: on the one hand, there is a desire
for broad agency discretion, largely based on efficiency82 and
expertise concerns, and on the other hand, there is a call for
vigorous judicial review to ensure that individuals are given due
process and to preserve the rule of law.83
These competing concerns inherent in administrative law
are also present in tax law, where the trade-off between
efficiency and fidelity to rule of law principles has been rather
extreme. Although there is de novo review of IRS deficiency and
refund determinations,84 with no (or very little) discretion given

80. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 736–37 (1974) (identifying one
of the objectives of the Anti-Injunction Act as protecting the need of the government to
collect taxes in an expeditious and unimpeded manner); Inv. Annuity, Inc. v. Blumenthal,
609 F.2d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (reiterating that government tax collection should be “free
from pre-enforcement judicial interference” (citing Bob Jones Univ., 416 U.S. at 736–37)).
81. See Levin, supra note 75, at 742.
82. For these purposes, efficiency relates to the IRS collection of the greatest portion
of unpaid taxes expeditiously at the least cost possible.
83. See Young, supra note 67, at 181 (calling the desire for agency discretion and
the yearning for vigorous judicial review the “center” of “deep-seated and contradictory
impulses” within administrative law).
84. The de novo nature of proceedings in the Tax Court has been a longstanding
feature of tax proceedings. E.g., Barry v. Comm’r, 1 B.T.A. 156, 157 (1924) (explaining
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to IRS determinations regarding the amount or existence of a
taxpayer’s proper liability or refund claims, the IRS has had
almost unlimited discretion in determining how it would collect
an agreed upon liability.85 Despite the de novo review afforded to
IRS determinations regarding the amount or existence of a
liability or refund, the pre-CDP judicial scheme applied to tax
collections is extremely deferential to agency expertise.86 CDP,
that “when a taxpayer brings his case before the Board [of Tax Appeals, the predecessor of
the Tax Court,] he proceeds by trial de novo”). De novo review ensures that a court will
take a fresh look at the facts and the law, irrespective of agency determinations. See Paul
R. Verkuil, An Outcomes Analysis of Scope of Review Standards, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV.
679, 688 (2002) (noting how Congress created different levels of review to calibrate the
degree of judicial oversight of agency action, with de novo review providing for “no
deference at all”). De novo review has traditionally been thought of as preserving
individual rights from the possibility of inappropriate agency conduct. See, e.g., Gabriel J.
Chin, Regulating Race: Asian Exclusion and the Administrative State, 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 1, 49 (2002) (explaining that “in some situations, de novo review is explicitly
intended to protect individual rights”).
85. See David Laro, Panel Discussion, The Evolution of the Tax Court as an
Independent Tribunal, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 17, 22–23 (noting that while the Tax Court
hears a variety of matters, its “primary function” remains the redetermination of
deficiencies). For a discussion of the differences between tax litigation in proceedings
before Article III federal district courts and the Article I U.S. Tax Court, see Leandra
Lederman, Equity and the Article I Court: Is the Tax Court’s Exercise of Equitable Powers
Constitutional?, 5 FLA. TAX REV. 357, 396–98 (2001) [hereinafter Lederman, Equity]
(discussing differences between the two fora, including different rules pertaining to
statutes of limitation and burden of proof).
86. One commentator has found the de novo review afforded to tax assessments
“ironic” because practical arguments such as efficiency and doctrinal tradition support
administrative finality. See Chin, supra note 84, at 48. Yet this view conflates the IRS’s
collection function with its liability and refund determination functions. Practicality and
efficiency concerns have dominated with respect to collection determinations, but not with
respect to liability or refund determinations.
One effect of the de novo review courts give to IRS adjudications with respect to the
amount or existence of the liability or refund is that the limited deference given to agency
findings actually may undercut some of the important benefits that flow from agency
fidelity to rule of law principles. See KENNETH CULP DAVIS, 2 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE § 12:13 (2d ed. 1979) (indicating that de novo review provides little opportunity
for judicial pressure on the IRS to conform to procedural requirements); see also Ferrari,
supra note 69, at 453 (criticizing de novo review for contributing to well-defined judicial
protections that result in “no audience to hear or redress any of [the taxpayer’s]
complaints concerning his treatment at the hand of the administrator”). The Tax Court
has long taken the view that it generally will not “look behind” the notice of deficiency to
examine the IRS’s conduct or the administrative record backstopping the IRS’s proposed
deficiency. Greenberg’s Express, Inc. v. Comm’r, 62 T.C. 324, 327 (1974). Although
Greenberg’s Express arose in the context of considering whether the Tax Court should
consider the reasons behind audit selection, its reach is much broader and has been cited
many times for the proposition that the courts generally do not look behind the IRS’s
proposed assessments of liability. For a discussion of the reach of Greenberg’s Express, see
Leandra Lederman, Are There Procedural Deficiencies in Tax Fraud Cases?: A Reply to
Professor Schoenfeld, 35 IND. L. REV. 143, 151–52 (2001).
As Professor Ferrari has observed, the Greenberg’s Express line of cases has
contributed to administrative insulation, resulting in the Tax Court “turn[ing] a blind eye
to taxpayer complaints about administrative failures by the Service.” Ferrari, supra note
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through its general scheme of abuse of discretion review of IRS
decisions regarding collection determinations, expands rule of
law principles to a previously unchecked area of agency action.
The pre-CDP lack of review for collection determinations
reflected practical concerns about the need to collect taxes
without unwanted delay, and CDP reflects Congress’s newfound
willingness to sacrifice somewhat efficiency in collections to
promote rule of law principles.87
CDP thus represents Congress’s commitment to expand, in a
limited way, rule of law principles to IRS collection adjudications.

69, at 428. “Instead, the Tax Court has chosen to focus upon the substantive
merits . . . rather than the procedural adequacy of the administrative determination
process, which the [Tax Court], with the sanction of the Supreme Court, considers
irrelevant.” Id. Although “Greenberg’s Express is an easy decision to dislike,” the Tax
Court’s policy of not looking behind the notice of deficiency to examine agency conduct
makes sense in light of the Tax Court’s statutory and common law restrictions on its
jurisdiction and its traditional role in redetermining deficiencies, not in regulating agency
conduct. Leandra Lederman, Deficient Statutory Notices and the Burdens of Proof: A
Reply to Mr. Newton, 92 TAX NOTES 117, 120–21 (July 2, 2001) [hereinafter Lederman,
Deficient Statutory Notices].
The effect of the Greenberg’s Express line of cases, and similar cases holding that
the IRS is not required to follow its internal procedures nor offer taxpayers settlement
conferences with the IRS Appeals Office even when its published procedural rules state
otherwise, is that the IRS’s fidelity to its standard adjudicatory practice is free from
judicial scrutiny. See United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 749–51 (1979) (holding that
evidence obtained in violation of internal IRS rules was admissible because the taxpayer’s
constitutional rights were not violated). The Court went on to explain that “as a matter of
administrative law . . . it seems clear that agencies are not required, at the risk of
invalidation of their action, to follow all of their rules, even those properly classified as
‘internal.’” Id. at 754 n.18; see also Luhring v. Glotzbach, 304 F.2d 560, 563 (4th Cir. 1962)
(“In our view the procedural rules do not have [the force and effect of law, nor are they
mandatory]; and compliance with them is not essential to the validity of a notice of
deficiency.”); Crowther v. Comm’r, 269 F.2d 292, 293 (9th Cir. 1959) (finding no error on
the part of the Tax Court for refusing to consider the taxpayers’ claims that the
Commissioner acted in an arbitrary manner in finding deficiencies in their returns by
failing to furnish them with a thirty-day letter and by failing to make a proper
investigation before sending out the ninety-day deficiency notices). Caceres has been
heavily criticized. See Rodney A. Smolla, The Erosion of the Principle that the Government
Must Follow Self-Imposed Rules, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 472, 485–86 (1984) (arguing that
Caceres results in occasional abuses and “delegitimizes and undermines the idea that
agency rules are a part of the essential fabric of a society governed by the rule of law
rather than official whim and caprice”); see also SALTZMAN, supra note 11, ¶ 1.07[3]
(suggesting that the effect of Caceres is that it is possible that similarly situated
taxpayers will get different agency treatment, raising “equal protection and due process
questions”).
87. Although an abuse of discretion standard is highly deferential and results in
relatively few cases in which IRS collection determinations are reversed, see Verkuil,
supra note 84, at 689 (positing that abuse of discretion review should lead to eighty-five to
ninety percent agency affirmance rates), it is nonetheless a significant check on agency
practice in that a third party—a reviewing court—will have occasion to examine the
previously unchecked IRS discretion. See Koch, Judicial Review, supra note 73, at 476
(noting that abuse of discretion review allows the agency to “fine tune” rules and allows
courts to “control[] only for extreme risk of error”).
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The expansion is limited because judicial review of collection
actions is on a highly deferential abuse of discretion basis and
does not extend to consideration of collection alternatives or IRS
collection actions outside of CDP. Yet even this limited
application of judicial review to collection actions is significant
and is a “dramatic departure” from past practice88 because even
deferential review exposes agency action to the broad daylight of
judicial scrutiny. The following subpart explores in more detail
administrative law concepts of abuse of discretion review and
examines how those concepts provide an indirect means of
ensuring that agencies use adequate procedures to better protect
taxpayer rights.
4. Overton Park, the Meaning of the Term Record, and the
Importance of Agency Explanation. The novelty of CDP relates
to both the standard of review and the subject matter of court
proceedings. Judicial review of the IRS determination regarding
a collection action is reviewed under an abuse of discretion
standard analogous to the standard found in APA section
706(2)(A).89 Judicial review of informal adjudications is

88. Fahey, supra note 32, at 464. CDP’s “dramatic departure” from prior practices
was foreshadowed by the increasing trend in the tax law to allow preassessment judicial
review of the amount or existence of a liability. The creation of a prepayment judicial
forum to review income, gift, and estate taxes and an increase in modernized
opportunities to challenge employment taxes before assessment typify this departure. See
id. at 457–58 (stating that the federal government historically enjoyed “virtually
unchecked collection powers” and describing the modern preassessment procedures
relative to income, gift, and estate taxes). These preassessment opportunities for judicial
review likewise create impediments to the collection of tax revenues, see id. at 458
(describing the assessment and collection prohibitions during the notice period and during
proceedings before the Tax Court), and run counter to the historical practice of only
allowing taxpayers postdeprivation opportunities to challenge the sovereign’s tax
determinations, id. at 454, yet they are essential ingredients of our modern tax system.
89. APA § 706(2)(A) provides that a reviewing court can set aside an agency’s
“action[s], findings, and conclusions” if they are “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2000). In
addition to setting aside agency actions found to be an abuse of discretion, the APA also
allows courts, in informal adjudications, to set aside findings that are unconstitutional,
outside the authority of an agency to make a challenged decision, or made “without
observance of procedure required by law.” § 706(2)(B)–(D). However, these three
additional categories are generally not relevant for CDP determinations. See CDP Notice,
supra note 34, at 30 (noting that the tax lien and levy scheme has already passed
constitutional muster).
Although the CDP statute is silent on the standard courts must employ in
reviewing collection action, the legislative history to the CDP provisions clarifies that
reviewing courts should consider an AO’s determination under an abuse of discretion
standard. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 105-599, at 266 (1998); see also Goza v. Comm’r, 114 T.C.
176, 181–82 (2000) (explaining that the de novo standard is used when “the validity of the
underlying tax liability is properly at issue” and that the abuse of discretion standard is
used when “the validity of the underlying tax liability is not properly at issue”).
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90
generally based on an abuse of discretion standard. There is a
significant amount of scholarship and case law concerning the
“abuse of discretion” standard.91 The method by which a court
reviews most agency actions for an abuse of discretion was first
set forth in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,92 the
seminal 1970 Supreme Court case that helped define the reach
of the APA’s abuse of discretion review. In Overton Park, the
Court brought into sharper focus the need for formal agency
procedures and more searching review, even in the relatively
uncharted world of informal adjudications, partially by
reassessing the merits of giving agencies the final say in
important policy matters.93 The Court explained that the abuse
of discretion standard, although more deferential than a de novo
review of agency actions, requires courts to engage in a
“substantial inquiry . . . [that does not] shield [the Agency’s
actions] from a thorough, probing, in-depth review” that
explores “whether the decision was based on a consideration of
the relevant factors.”94 As Professor Young has indicated, the
juxtaposition of a requirement that a reviewing court engage in
a thorough, probing, in-depth review with a supposedly
deferential standard of review is generated by the same tension
between rule of law and agency deference principles that
underlies the whole of administrative law.95
The application of this somewhat contradictory standard
highlights the importance of agency action and conduct to a
court review of agency determinations in informal
adjudications. In matters involving the review of agency actions
on an abuse of discretion basis, the administrative record is
crucial to a court’s ability to determine whether the agency’s
decision will survive judicial scrutiny.96 Overton Park states that
although informal proceedings are not “on the record” in the

90. David P. Currie & Frank I. Goodman, Judicial Review of Federal
Administrative Action: Quest for the Optimum Forum, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 55 (1975)
(explaining that judicial review of informal agency adjudications proceeds “under the
general review provisions of the APA”); see also 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
91. See, generally, e.g., Verkuil, supra note 84 (providing an outcomes analysis of
the various standards of review in the context of congressional intent and Supreme Court
interpretation); Young, supra note 67 (discussing the “abuse of discretion” and “arbitrary
and capricious” standards of review in the context of the Overton Park holding).
92. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
93. Prior to Overton Park, the type of analysis courts employed in reviewing
informal action resembled the “toothless rational basis test” associated with substantive
due process challenges to legislation. See Young, supra note 67, at 203–04 & n.84.
94. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 415–16.
95. See Young, supra note 67, at 190.
96. See id. at 209.
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technical sense of the term under the APA, the presence of a
record is key to a court’s ability to implement Overton Park’s
mandate.97 Notwithstanding the importance of a record to a
review of informal adjudications, one of the further
contradictions of Overton Park and administrative law generally
is that they do not provide any definition of what a record is.
The term “record” is amorphous, essentially including “all the
material that the agency considered in reaching its decision.”98
The effect of the Overton Park approach is that once the record
is identified, its status is largely that of formal records produced
in formal administrative decisions:
Any specific factfinding, crucial to an agency’s decision,
must be adequately supported by the evidentiary record
which was before the agency when it acted. If the purely
legal reasoning is adequate (“the statute permits us to ban
dangerous products”), then the decision stands or falls
depending on whether the factual record adequately
supports the factual portion (“this is a dangerous product”)
of the agency’s actual reasoning to its conclusion (“therefore
99
it is banned”).
Closely related to the importance of the record is the Overton
Park rule that an agency adequately explain its decision.100 The
emphasis on the adequacy of an agency explanation points to the
importance of the agency’s legal analysis at the time of the
administrative determination and prevents the agency from
offering post hoc justifications at the time of judicial review.101
Although academics have criticized the Overton Park “onthe
- record requirement” because of its imprecise nature and the
difficulty it creates for courts and litigators in determining what
in fact the record is,102 it reflects both rule of law and agency
deference concerns. By limiting courts from considering new
evidence or agency arguments on appeal, the on-the- record
requirement promotes efficient resolution of disputes. At the
97. See Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 419–21 (stating that the “whole record” is the
basis for review).
98. Young, supra note 67, at 208.
99. Id. at 209 (footnotes omitted).
100. See Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 420–21 (stating that an agency could prepare
formal findings to explain its action and that a court might even require additional
explanation).
101. Young, supra note 67, at 210. Moreover, to guard against erroneous agency
action, abuse of discretion review subjects an agency to court consideration of whether the
agency has given proper consideration to all relevant factors in its legal analysis. Id. at
209–10 & n.18.
102. See, e.g., William F. Pedersen, Jr., Formal Records and Informal Rulemaking,
85 YALE L.J. 38, 61 (1975).
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same time, by requiring that agency decisions stand or fall based
upon previously submitted and considered facts and adequate
agency legal analysis and explanation, the on-the-record
requirement helps ensure that agency practices when initially
considering a matter are sufficient so that courts can adequately
review their determinations.
5. Abuse of Discretion Review in Tax Adjudications Differs
from the Overton Park Standard. Although abuse of discretion
review is the exception in tax determinations, a number of
provisions in the context of deficiency determinations are
reviewed on that basis.103 Moreover, other IRS determinations
subject to abuse of discretion review are not generally reviewed
in the context of deficiency determinations, but special
jurisdictional provisions allow for judicial review of those
determinations, notwithstanding the Anti-Injunction Act’s
prohibition of most IRS determinations outside of deficiency or
refund procedures.104 Generally, as the Tax Court held in the
recent case of Ewing v. Commissioner, these tax determinations
are generally not subject to the on-the- record rule, and the Tax
Court holds de novo trials.105 The Tax Court approach results in

103. See Ewing v. Comm’r, 122 T.C. 32, 40 (2004) (noting that de novo review by the
Tax Court for an abuse of discretion by the IRS applies to (1) “determin[ations] that a
taxpayer’s method of accounting did not clearly reflect income”; (2) “reallocat[ions of]
income or deductions” among related parties; (3) “fail[ures] to waive penalties and
additions to tax”; and (4) bad debt deductions). The Tax Court has applied the abuse of
discretion standard on a number of different occasions. See, e.g., Mailman v. Comm’r, 91
T.C. 1079, 1084 (1988) (considering the IRS’s discretion to waive a civil understatement
penalty and stating that abuse of discretion is based on the Code and regulations’
ascertainable standards to which the IRS is subject and entails a judicial determination of
whether the IRS acted “arbitrarily, capriciously, or without sound basis in fact”); Estate of
Gardner v. Comm’r, 82 T.C. 989, 1000 (1984) (considering the IRS’s denial of an extension
to file an estate tax return and stating that agency abuse of discretion would arise “if [this
decision] were made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from
established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis”).
104. For example, under I.R.C. § 6404(i) the Tax Court has jurisdiction to review IRS
failures to abate interest on an abuse of discretion basis. I.R.C. § 6404(i)(1) (West 2004);
e.g., Goettee v. Comm’r, 85 T.C.M. (CCH) 867, 877 (2003).
The Tax Court may also consider on an abuse of discretion basis IRS
determinations concerning the IRS’s decision to grant equitable relief from joint and
several liability; these may arise as a stand-alone matter or within the context of
deficiency procedures. Ewing, 122 T.C. at 36–37.
105. Ewing, 122 T.C. at 37–39. Although Ewing involves the application of the onthe-record rule to a review of IRS equitable relief innocent spouse proceedings, its reach is
likely much further because its rationale is equally applicable to all proceedings,
including CDP, subject to abuse of discretion review. See Pless v. Comm’r, 87 T.C.M.
(CCH) 845, 847 (2004) (citing Ewing and allowing consideration of testimony at trial or
evidence as to whether Ms. Pless qualified for relief under section 6015(f) that was not
presented during the telephonic hearing). Relying on Ewing, the Tax Court in Robinette v.
Commissioner, 123 T.C. 4489 (2004) held that when reviewing for abuse of discretion
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deference to agency determinations, but the proceedings closely
resemble other Tax Court proceedings that are completed on a de
novo basis. The Tax Court’s approach to the matter—that it will
hold trials de novo in situations where an abuse of discretion
standard applies—is arguably taxpayer friendly and sensitive to
rule of law concerns. It ensures that taxpayers get a proper
opportunity to present evidence that, because of the IRS’s
administrative-level informality, may not have been before the
IRS.106
6. Summing up the IRS’s Isolation from Administrative
Law Principles. The importance of the preceding discussion is its
revelation that tax adjudications are not part of the
administrative law landscape. Tax adjudications stand alone.
This isolation is explained largely by historical practice,107 a
under § 6330(d), the APA does not control review of CDP determinations, and the court’s
review is not limited to the administrative record. Id. at 4493. The court cited Judge
Thornton’s concurrence in Ewing stating that the APA has never governed proceedings in
the Tax Court and that the Tax Court’s de novo procedures actually provide a stricter
scope of review than APA judicial review procedures. Id. In a dissenting opinion, Judges
Halpern and Holmes disagreed with the application of Ewing, asserting that Ewing was
based on unique aspects of § 6015 that should not be extended to § 6330. Id. at 4504
(Halpern and Holmes, J.J., dissenting). They also emphasized that the application of an
abuse of discretion review does not necessarily mean that the Tax Court is free to
substitute its judgment for the Commissioner’s judgment. Id. at 4505 n.6 (Halpern and
Holmes, J.J., dissenting).
106. The IRS Appeals Office conducts traditionally informal hearings, and taxpayers
do not have the right to subpoena and examine witnesses or to subpoena documents. E.g.,
Barnhill v. Comm’r, 83 T.C.M. (CCH) 1624, 1626 (2002); Treas. Reg. § 301.6330-1(d)(2)
Q&A-D6 (2004).
Concerns about limited information before a reviewing agency have led Professors
Currie and Goodman to conclude that the on-the-record rule of Overton Park is “hard to
take . . . at face value [because] . . . the party tendering new evidence may have had no
opportunity to be heard at the administrative level.” Currie & Goodman, supra note 90, at
59. Professors Currie and Goodman continued, “[A strict application of the on-the-record
rule] would often reduce judicial review to a rubber stamp, especially where the proffered
evidence tended to expose the administrative record as a product of superficial and
inadequate investigation.” Id. This concern seems less applicable in collection
determinations, in which IRS determinations often relate to decisions regarding a
taxpayer’s financial circumstances, circumstances that the taxpayer should be able to
describe and provide evidence of to the IRS. To the extent that a taxpayer is unable to
provide that information, or a type of information outside the control of the taxpayer, it
may make sense for a reviewing court to provide some limited exceptions to the on the
record rule.
107. Ewing, 122 T.C. at 35–36. The relatively toothless abuse of discretion review
prior to Overton Park may likely have inspired the Tax Court to chart its own more
searching inquiry to help ensure agency fidelity to rule of law principles. As discussed
above, with Overton Park and the general trend in administrative law providing for a
more searching review of informal agency adjudications, the Tax Court’s different
approach is less justifiable. With its lack of scrutiny of agency practice and
decisionmaking, the Tax Court’s approach may in fact create fewer opportunities to
sanction improper agency practices. Interestingly, district court review of collection
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practice that, with respect to the exemption of collection
determinations from judicial review, stems from a belief that the
government interest in tax adjudication is so vital that it
warrants special treatment and unbridled discretion. Tax
adjudications also stand alone with respect to abuse of discretion
review, an approach also largely justified by historical practice
giving the court a more meaningful opportunity to review IRS
determinations and to consider evidence that may not have been
before the IRS at the time of its determination. Part III.C below
examines how tax adjudications fit in with broader themes of
constitutional law and reveals how constitutional law similarly
isolates tax law from the mainstream.
C. The IRS Adjudicatory Role in Constitutional Context
Constitutional law principles as applied to tax adjudications
have affected the courts’ deference to the IRS’s role as tax
collector. As such, in adjudications, constitutional law, like
administrative law, has done little in the way of offering
procedural protections to taxpayers.
1. What Does “Due Process” Have to Do with “Collection
Due Process”? The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
provides that “no person . . . shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law.” Procedural due process
generally requires two elements prior to the deprivation of a
protected interest: notice and the opportunity for a hearing.108
Although the last few decades of the twentieth century saw an
explosion of procedural developments designed to ensure that
government actions did not deprive an individual of property
rights or privacy rights before adequate notice and hearing, tax
cases have remained outside the due process mainstream.109 The
determinations in CDP cases generally does not reflect the Tax Court’s approach to abuse
of discretion review. See Robinette v. Comm’r, 123 T.C. 4489, 4505 (2004) (Halpern &
Holmes, J.J., dissenting).
108. Cf. United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 47 (1993) (“The
right to prior notice and a hearing is central to the Constitution’s command of due
process.”); Lederman, “Civil”izing, supra note 52, at 216–21 (questioning whether the
notice of deficiency required by I.R.C. § 6212 satisfies the constitutional requirement of
notice); see also RODNEY L. MOTT, DUE PROCESS OF LAW 208 (1926) (noting that “notice
and hearing as a part of due process of law was a natural corollary of the idea that that
phrase embodied the essential principles of the common law of England”). The
substantive due process inquiry is whether the government has sufficient justification to
deprive a person of life, liberty, or property. For a general discussion of substantive due
process, see ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 7.1
(1997).
109. This flurry of procedural development, referred to as the procedural due process
revolution, commenced after the landmark decision of Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261
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Supreme Court has long held that a delay in the determination of
property rights, a postdeprivation hearing, may be sufficient
process in situations where it is “essential that governmental
needs be immediately satisfied.”110 As a result, the Supreme
Court has allowed the government, without a preseizure hearing,
to destroy food thought to be unsafe111 and to seize drugs thought
to mislabeled.112 The Supreme Court has held that collection of
revenue, like the destruction of property for public health
reasons, is an essential government need justifying a
postdeprivation hearing, that is, a hearing after tax payment or
enforced collection through administrative collection tools.113
Summary proceedings by distraint appeared in our earliest
revenue laws,114 and courts have held constitutionally sufficient
taxpayers’ ability to recover erroneously assessed and collected
taxes after those taxes had been paid voluntarily or collected

(1970) (finding a procedural due process violation where public assistance payments were
terminated without a prior opportunity for an evidentiary hearing); see also Henry J.
Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1268 (1975) (noting that after
Goldberg, “we have witnessed a due process explosion in which the Court has carried the
hearing requirement from one new area of government action to another”); Charles H.
Koch, Jr., A Community of Interest in the Due Process Calculus, 37 HOUS. L. REV. 635, 639
(2000) [hereinafter Koch, Due Process Calculus] (noting that there was “an explosion in
procedural innovation” following Goldberg v. Kelly); cf. Paul R. Verkuil, A Study of
Informal Adjudicative Procedures, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 739, 739 n.2 (1976) (suggesting that
the due process revolution had “noteworthy antecedents” to Goldberg). For a good, brief
historical discussion of the growth of procedural due process protections and recent
limitations on the reach of procedural due process, see Christine N. Cimini, Welfare
Entitlements in the Era of Devolution, 9 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 89, 105–07
(2002); see also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Due Process Counterrevolution of the 1990s?, 96
COLUM. L. REV. 1973, 1988–89 (1996) (suggesting a reduction in due process rights in
areas such as welfare benefits and prisoner rights in which the legislature has clarified
that individuals do not have statutorily created entitlements). For a different view, see
generally Cynthia R. Farina, On Misusing “Revolution” and “Reform”: Procedural Due
Process and the New Welfare Act, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 591 (1998) (responding to Professor
Pierce, giving a more complex and ambiguous history of contemporary procedural due
process, and adopting a different view of the current status of “new welfare” benefits).
110. Phillips v. Comm’r, 283 U.S. 589, 596–97 (1931).
111. See N. Am. Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306, 315 (1908) (holding that
“a hearing before seizure and condemnation and destruction of food which is
unwholesome and unfit for use, is not necessary”).
112. See Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594, 598 (1950)
(reaffirming earlier holdings that “no hearing at the preliminary stage is required by due
process so long as the requisite hearing is held before the final administrative order
becomes effective”).
113. See Phillips, 283 U.S. at 595–97; see also Fahey, supra note 32, at 486–88
(providing a description of and justification for taxpayers’ postdeprivation rights).
114. E.g., Act of Mar. 3, 1791, ch. 15, § 23, 1 Stat. 199, 204 (1791) (“[T]he amount of
the duties [on spirits] so refused or neglected to be paid, may either be recovered with
costs of suit in an action of debt . . . or may be levied by distress and sale of goods of the
person or persons refusing or neglecting to pay . . . .”).
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115
through seizure or levy. Taxpayers have long had the right to
bring a refund claim and suit after assessment and payment or
collection to ensure redress for improper government action.116
Given the limited constitutional nature of tax cases, it is
generally thought that the CDP provisions have little to do with
117
constitutional procedural due process protections. Rather, like
118
the spate of bill of rights provisions covering matters both
important and mundane, perhaps CDP reflects a means for the
legislature to communicate with the public about the public’s
119
sense of dissatisfaction with government. CDP does not reflect

115. See, e.g., Stonecipher v. Bray, 653 F.2d 398, 403 (9th Cir. 1981) (reiterating that
prompt tax collection is an important national interest, thereby justifying a postponement
of notice and opportunity for a hearing).
116. Refund suits directly against the United States became possible in 1855 with
the creation of the Court of Claims. Act of Feb. 24, 1855, ch. 122, 10 Stat. 612 (1855). In
1870, taxpayers were permitted to bring refund actions against the United States in
federal district court. Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 359, § 2, 24 Stat. 505 (1887). Prior to 1855,
the sole recourse was to bring a refund suit against the collector of the internal revenue;
this right was discontinued in 1966. Pub. L. No. 89-713, § 3, 80 Stat. 1107, 1108 (1966);
see Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145, 177 (1960), aff’g on reh’g, 357 U.S. 63 (1958)
(establishing that a taxpayer must fully pay the tax prior to filing a refund suit with
respect to income, estate, and gift taxes). District court refund jurisdiction is now found at
28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1) (2000). For a discussion of the historical lineage of refund suits, see
Leandra Lederman, Equity, supra note 85, 401–11 (discussing the refund suit as the
lineal successor of the common count in indebitatus assumpsit for money had and
received).
117. See Camp, supra note 5, at 119 (implying that collection due process has little
relation to traditional due process concerns by referring to the CDP provisions as the
“massively misnamed ‘Due Process’ provisions”).
118. William Safire, On Language, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Aug. 1, 1999, at 22, 22–24
(discussing the growth of the catch phrase “bill of rights” in a host of substantive areas:
G.I. benefits, crime victims’ rights, voters rights, hospital patients’ rights, and taxi
passengers’ rights). See generally Leandra Lederman, Of Taxpayer Rights, Wrongs, and a
Proposed Remedy, 87 TAX NOTES 1133 (2000) (arguing that the proposed taxpayer bills of
rights are symbolic rather than effective and proposing a civil damages remedy instead);
Steve Johnson, A Residual Damages Right Against the IRS: A Cure Worse than the
Disease, 88 TAX NOTES 395 (2000) (finding Professor Lederman’s proposal deficient and
suggesting a commitment to the current direction of taxpayer protection); Leandra
Lederman, Taxpayer Rights In the Lurch: A Response to Professor Johnson, 88 TAX NOTES
1041 (2000) (responding to Professor Johnson’s critique and remaking her own case for a
civil damages remedy).
119. An example of Congress speaking to taxpayers’ concerns is found in § 7491,
enacted as a part of RRA 98. I.R.C. § 7491 (West 2004). Historically, the burden of proof in
tax adjudications had been on the taxpayer; the enactment of I.R.C. § 7491 changed that
by providing for a shift in the burden of proof to the IRS if the taxpayer presents “credible
evidence.” See id.; see also Leslie Book, The New Collection Due Process Taxpayer Rights,
86 TAX NOTES 1127, 1132 (2000) (noting the emphasis RRA 98’s lawmakers placed on
connecting RRA 98 to general antigovernment sentiment); Steve R. Johnson, The Dangers
of Symbolic Legislation: Perceptions and Realities of the New Burden-of-Proof Rules, 84
IOWA L. REV. 413, 446–48 (1999) (explaining that § 7491 was passed because Congress
needed to politically respond to the public’s dissatisfaction with the tax system). For
a
fascinating discussion of the importance of symbolism in tax legislation, see MURRAY
EDELMAN, THE SYMBOLIC USES OF POLITICS 26–28 (1964) (suggesting the divergence
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a legislative intervention into or overturning of the settled state
of procedural due process tax jurisprudence. The cases
compromising that jurisprudence essentially state that the
hearing process that is due before the government can commence
summary collection procedures need not be judicial; rather,
discretionary administrative preassessment procedures, largely
through the examination and IRS Appeals Office procedures,
backstopped by a postdeprivation right to a refund action in
federal district court or the Court of Federal Claims, are all the
constitutionally required process due to taxpayers.120
In some ways, the tax system’s absence from the due process
developments of the late twentieth century may be surprising
given that until 1933 and the advent of the New Deal, tax cases
constituted the majority of the Supreme Court’s procedural due
process caseload.121 Yet by the early twentieth century and the
introduction of the modern tax system in 1913,122 it was
essentially black letter law that predeprivation taxpayer
administrative
or
judicial
hearing
rights
were
not
constitutionally required. This was because of two related
concepts: (1) the government’s revenue needs were too important
to warrant the delays inherent in predeprivation hearings, and
(2) derivatively, the interposition of a potentially hostile judiciary
between the taxpayer and the treasury was thought to give rise
to a risk creating a chokehold on the flow of revenues.123
With the exception of cases in which taxpayers do not receive
actual notice of the IRS’s intent to assess additional tax124 and
between the symbolism of federal tax legislation and its effects).
120. See Fahey, supra note 32, at 454, 460–61; Lederman, Equity, supra note 85, at
398, 412.
121. See MASHAW, supra note 49, at 61 (explaining that during the nineteenth
century most government regulation was related to taxation and that over sixty percent of
all due process cases reaching the Supreme Court before 1933 were tax cases).
122. For a brief history of the events leading up to the passage of the Sixteenth
Amendment and the adoption of the modern income tax in 1913, see DANIEL Q. POSIN &
DONALD B. TOBIN, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 1.01 (6th ed. 2003).
123. See MOTT, supra note 108, at 220 (discussing how the exigencies of efficiency in
the collection of taxes required that both notice and hearing rights in taxation were
historically less than in most other areas of law); see also Fahey, supra note 32, at 461–62.
124. See I.R.C. § 6330(c)(2)(B) (providing that a person may raise at the hearing
challenges to the existence or amount of the liability “if the person did not receive any
statutory notice of deficiency for such tax liability or did not otherwise have an
opportunity to dispute such tax liability”). Although adequate notice and hearing rights
are the mainstays of procedural due process jurisprudence, actual notice is not a
procedural due process requirement. See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339
U.S. 306, 319 (1950); see also Lederman, “Civil”izing, supra note 52, at 215–16 (describing
how the state has to use procedures only “reasonably calculated” to reach the intended
party). In fact, CDP grants additional administrative and judicial hearing rights to
taxpayers who may not have received actual notice but to whom the government would
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cases in which taxpayers are requesting so-called innocent
spouse protections,125 in CDP proceedings, taxpayers do not have
additional administrative or judicial hearing rights concerning
the amount or existence of a liability. Instead, CDP involves
additional procedures respecting the government’s power to
collect an agreed-upon liability. Although the CDP procedures
relate to the IRS’s provisional collection powers, those collection
powers arise only after an assessment, and for the most part,
taxpayers have significant procedural and statutory rights to
administrative review and statutory rights to judicial review of
the IRS’s proposed actions giving rise to an assessment.126 These
procedural and statutory preassessment rights, which have
grown over time, serve to reduce the risk that the government
will erroneously propose that a taxpayer owes additional money
to the government. They soften the effect of the constitutional
law principles that would otherwise suggest that the risk of error
in IRS assessment determinations is far outweighed by the
government’s need to dispense with trial-like procedures and
ensure the prompt flow of tax revenue.
Yet, CDP does seem somehow connected by more than just
name to traditional procedural due process concerns. Although
judges and academics alike have spilled much ink in the area of
procedural due process,127 little of it has addressed the tax
sy
s tem.128 The due process revolution of the 1970s and 1980s,
have satisfied its notice requirements under traditional procedural due process
jurisprudence. See Book, supra note 119, at 1147 (contrasting the notice requirements
under I.R.C. § 6212 with those in the CDP proceedings).
125. See I.R.C. § 6330(c)(2)(A)(i) (allowing taxpayers to raise “appropriate spousal
defenses” in CDP proceedings). See also generally Raymond v. Comm’r, 119 T.C. 191
(2002) (considering an innocent spouse claim during a CDP hearing).
126. For a discussion of the significant preassessment taxpayer procedural rights,
see SALTZMAN, supra note 11, chs. 8–9.
127. See Richard A. Epstein, No New Property, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 747, 748 (1990)
(noting that although, in his view, Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) was wrongly
decided, and although it has been the subject of “extensive commentary” and “endless
elaboration, qualification and even contraction over the years, its importance, if not its
influence, continues to grow with time” (footnote omitted)).
128. For an exception, see Larry J. Roberts, Laing Down a Challenge: The Future of
Due Process and Tax Collections, 11 GONZ. L. REV. 369 (1976) (discussing how due process
developments brought into question the constitutionality of prior law jeopardy collection
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code). A jeopardy or termination assessment begins
when the IRS believes “prior to assessment, . . . that collection will be endangered if
regular assessment and collection procedures are followed.” See INTERNAL REVENUE
MANUAL (CCH) § 4.15.1.2 (June 30, 1999). Congress amended the jeopardy assessment
provisions to allow taxpayers the right to obtain administrative and judicial review of IRS
jeopardy assessment actions. I.R.C. § 7429; see also SALTZMAN, supra note 11,
¶ 10.05[7][a] (providing a description of the changes made to jeopardy and termination
assessments in the mid-1970s). Before 1976, the Service, relying on the Anti-Injunction
Act, did not submit to judicial review of jeopardy or termination assessments. SALTZMAN,
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129
covering landmark cases like Goldberg v. Kelly, Mathews v.
Eldridge,130 and Board of Regents v. Roth,131 placed the Supreme
Court in the position of determining whether there was in fact a
protected privacy, property, or liberty interest and, if there was,
how much process was due after the Court applied a utilitarianbased balancing test that resulted in a general expansion of
situations in which a predeprivation hearing right was
constitutionally required.132
Following the due process revolution, courts have continued
to place tax cases outside the mainstream of due process
jurisprudence. For example, in Fuentes v. Shevin,133 the Supreme
Court stated that “extraordinary situations,” including taxation,
justify postponing notice and hearing until after a deprivation,
but that those situations are “unusual.”134 In addition, Fuentes set
forth three factors common to cases in which the Court has held
that preseizure hearing was not necessary: the seizure must be
“necessary to secure an important governmental or general
public interest,” there must be “a special need for very prompt
action,” and the state must have “kept strict control over its
monopoly of legitimate force.”135 Without analysis, Fuentes stated
that the above factors therefore “allowed summary seizure of
property to collect the internal revenue of the United States, to
meet the needs of a national war effort, to protect against the
economic disaster of a bank failure, and to protect the public
from misbranded drugs and contaminated food.”136 The lumping

supra note 11, ¶ 10.05[7][a].
129. 397 U.S. 254, 261 (1970) (holding that due process requires a hearing prior to
termination of benefits received under a federal program).
130. 424 U.S. 319, 323 (1976) (considering the adequacy of Social Security
Administration procedures to determine that an individual was no longer entitled to
disability payments). In Mathews, the Court analyzed the adequacy of existing procedures
by applying a three-part inquiry considering the private interest affected by the official
action; the risk of an erroneous deprivation of that interest through procedures used and
the probable value of additional safeguards; and the government’s interest, including the
administrative burden that additional requirements would impose. Id. at 334–35.
131. 408 U.S. 564, 569, 573–75 (1972) (holding that a nontenured professor whose
contract was not renewed did not have a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest and
therefore was not entitled to procedural due process protection).
132. See Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court’s Due Process Calculus for
Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory
of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28, 46–49 (1976) (arguing that the Mathews test is a
utilitarian analysis creating a social welfare function). Professor Aleinikoff calls this test
the foundation of modern due process analysis. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff,
Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 994 (1987).
133. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
134. Id. at 90.
135. Id. at 91.
136. Id. at 91–92 (footnotes omitted).
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of taxation together with other extraordinary situations,
however, is not persuasive: although collecting taxes is crucial to
the nation’s well-being, the need for speed that might justify the
absence of a predeprivation hearing seems much more
pronounced when considering government actions to destroy
contaminated food or mislabeled drugs.137
Although these cases isolating tax from mainstream
138
procedural due process jurisprudence are entrenched, when one
scratches the surface of the tax system’s place within procedural
due process jurisprudence, the CDP provisions, at a minimum,
reflect some analytical dissatisfaction with the deep structure of
th
e tax cases. 139 Case law considering what process is due to
taxpayers does not reflect the importance that society (through
the legislature) now attaches to individuals’ rights in the
collection process and overstates the government’s interest in
prompt payment of taxes.
The following subpart reveals the deep roots of the tax
sy
s tem’s exemption from most modern procedural due process
jurisprudence, which provides a perspective for considering the
merits of the CDP provisions.
2. Murray’s Lessee and the Nineteenth Century Approach
to Due Process. Considering the due process jurisprudence of tax
cases requires a return to the underpinning of all these cases:

137. See Roberts, supra note 128, at 396 (stating that the vitality of procedural due
process jurisprudence as applied to tax law is questionable, as the cases do not rest on
“careful analysis” and “merely observe that taxes are the nation’s lifeblood and that the
nation’s continued existence depends upon their swift and unhindered collection”); cf.
United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 60 (1993) (stating in dicta
that earlier cases upholding the constitutionality of the modern tax assessment process
“relied upon the availability, and adequacy, of these [BTA, the predecessor to the Tax
Court,] preseizure administrative procedures in holding that no judicial hearing was
required prior to the seizure of property”). Moreover, the IRS, through its jeopardy and
termination assessment procedures, has the power to quickly assess and collect when
there are critical reasons to dispense with procedural protections. Refer to note 128 supra
(discussing the Internal Revenue Manual rule allowing collection to begin when the IRS
believes collection will be hindered if normal procedures are followed).
138. See, e.g., Martinez v. IRS, 744 F.2d 71, 72–73 (10th Cir. 1984) (holding that due
process is satisfied by postcollection judicial review and imposing sanctions on taxpayer
who filed a frivolous return); Kalb v. United States, 505 F.2d 506, 510 (2d Cir. 1974)
(stating that “collection of taxes by summary proceedings, with judicial review afforded
after assessment, does not violate due process”); Tavares v. United States, 491 F.2d 725,
726 (9th Cir. 1974) (considering the administrative levy powers under § 6331 and stating
that modern procedural due process developments do not require a judicial hearing prior
to seizure).
139. Cf. Roberts, supra note 128, at 397 (critiquing cases that rely on the truism that
taxes are the “nation’s lifeblood” for not adequately analyzing the government’s interest in
collecting taxes through less drastic means).
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Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co. The
Supreme Court’s consideration of tax cases in the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries reflected a mode of analysis that
centered on tradition and analogy and considered whether the
process in question conformed to an historical notion of the usual
processes at law.141 In contrast, as mentioned above, the current
state of procedural due process jurisprudence reflects an interest
balancing that considers whether the procedures in effect
approximate a tolerable amount of accuracy in light of the
potentially competing government and individual interests.142
More than a century and a half has passed since Murray’s Lessee
was decided, and its vitality as a due process case other than in
the tax area is limited. Yet in cases in which taxpayers have
challenged aspects of the tax system on procedural due process
grounds, the courts have largely adopted the Murray’s Lessee
approach as the underlying basis for sustaining the
constitutionality of the tax structure and justifying the notion
that postdeprivation judicial remedies are constitutionally
adequate.143
Although Murray’s Lessee and its progeny are well
established, analyzing its reasoning helps explain how CDP
reveals a sharpening of the interests at stake in the tax collection
process. In Murray’s Lessee, the Court held that an act of
Congress authorizing a summary warrant to issue against a
delinquent tax collector without oath for the seizure of his

140. 59 U.S. 272 (1855); see MASHAW, supra note 49, at 61–62 (calling Murray’s
Lessee “the earliest attack on administrative procedure on due process grounds”).
141. See MASHAW, supra note 49, at 44. The concept of due process of law was born of
two provisions in the Magna Carta: Due process expects justice through the “judgment of
[one’s] peers” and “the law of the land.” See MOTT, supra note 108, at 32–37, 45
(discussing the evolution of the English concept of due process of law and its effect on the
U.S. legal system). Both clauses have been much debated; however, three things are
certain: 1) due process protected people against arbitrary actions by the English
monarchy, 2) the two clauses are complementary, suggesting that justice is done if one of
the two is satisfied, and 3) “the law of the land” is synonymous with legality and justice
according to reigning legal principles. Id. at 32–36. The Magna Carta supplied “the
conception of a fundamental statute by which other statutes might be tested as regards
their validity.” Id. at 42–44.
142. Farina, supra note 109, at 614–15 (stating that government discretion is
“constrained by only whatever limits the majoritarian political process decides to impose
on the particular regulatory enterprise”).
143. Murray’s Lessee recognized, however, that the general vision of due process
constituted trial-like procedural protections, but not every area of law required that
approach. See MASHAW, supra note49 , at 67 (explaining that although trial was the most
common way of deciding contested facts, this method was not always followed in the due
process area); see also Fahey, supra note 32, at 467–68 & n.94 (explaining that the
concept of procedural due process in the tax system can be traced to cases such as
Murray’s Lessee and Phillips v. Comm’r, 289 U.S. 589 (1931)).
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144
property reflected due process of law. The plaintiff was an
individual creditor, as was the government, of the delinquent tax
collector and the plaintiff sought to invalidate the government’s
summary seizure of the delinquent tax collector’s land.145 The
Court applied a two-tier test for determining whether the
government’s summary distress procedure was consistent with
the law of the land, and thus not subject to judicial proceedings.
First, the Court looked to the Constitution itself “to see whether
this process [was] in conflict with any of its provisions.”146 Second,
the Court examined whether the procedure conformed to “settled
usages and modes of proceeding existing in the common and
statu[t]e law of England, before the emigration of our ancestors,
and which are shown not to have been unsuited to their civil and
political condition by having been acted on by them after the
settlement of this country.”147
Murray’s Lessee is technically not a case involving taxpayer
challenges to the sovereign’s assertion or collection of a tax
liability. Nonetheless, it involved what types of protections are
due when the government seeks to collect upon a debt owed to it.
As such, it can be said that the sovereign’s long tradition of using
summary nontrial proceedings to collect on tax debts underlies
Murray’s Lessee’s holding that due process does not entail judicial
proceedings in that context. To justify its conclusion, Murray’s
Lessee examined tax history, including practices in England, the
colonies, and the states between the signing of the Declaration of
Independence and the ratification of the Constitution; the thencurrent practices of the states; and the functional necessities of
tax administration.148 In its consideration of historical practices,

144. Murray’s Lessee, 59 U.S. at 284–85.
145. The government sold the land to the Murray’s Lessee defendant, and the
plaintiff brought an ejection action against the defendant based in part on the
government’s original seizure of the tax collector’s land was invalid due to the lack of
trial-like judicial protections the government used in its seizure. Id. at 274.
146. Id. at 277.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 277–79. Later cases followed this approach as well. See Cheatham v.
United States, 92 U.S. 85, 88–89 (1875).
All governments, in all times, have found it necessary to adopt stringent
measures for the collection of taxes, and to be rigid in the enforcement of them.
. . . [A]ppeals are allowed to specified tribunals as the law-makers deem
expedient. . . .
....
. . . [T]he general government has wisely made the payment of the tax
claimed . . . a condition precedent to a resort to the courts . . . .
Id. Cheatham also warned that any judicial power to delay or control tax collection might
place “the very existence of the government . . . in the power of a hostile judiciary.” Id. at
89; see also McMillen v. Anderson, 95 U.S. 37, 41 (1877) (upholding Louisiana’s method of
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Murray’s Lessee noted that since the time of King Henry VIII,
English law had recognized nonjudicial procedures for collecting
debts due the sovereign and that no colonial repudiation of such
practices had occurred.149 Underlying this historical viewpoint
was an implication, without analysis, that a parade of horribles
might befall the system if the Court were to mandate additional
procedural protections and invalidate longstanding practices.
Further, when considering the adequacy of the provisions, the
Court did not balance the general interests of the sovereign and
the taxpayers in the nature of a judicial proceeding against the
government’s interests in avoiding delay tactics and in securing
immediate payment of taxes.150 Murray’s Lessee also did not
consider whether the sovereign could collect taxes “by less drastic
means”;151 rather, it stated, without analysis, that few
governments “can permit their claims for public taxes . . . to
become subjects of judicial controversy.152
3. Bringing It Back to CDP. In procedural due process
cases, the Supreme Court has rejected the Murray’s Lessee mode
of analysis inherent in the nineteenth century tax cases—that is,
an analysis based on custom and analogy—and replaced it with
interest-balancing.153 As indicated above, the Court has continued
to classify tax cases as exceptional and it is reluctant to impose
interest-balancing on the evaluation of the levels of procedural

assessing and collecting liquor taxes from delinquent taxpayers against a taxpayer’s claim
that the assessment of the tax without notice to the taxpayer and the collection of taxes
by administrative seizure violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
The nation from whom we inherit the phrase “due process of law” has never
relied upon the courts of justice for the collection of her taxes, though she passed
through a successful revolution in resistance to unlawful taxation. . . . The tax
collector may, without judicial formality, proceed to seize and sell . . . the
property . . . to pay the tax and costs.
Id.
It has, however, been repeatedly decided by this court that the
proceedings to raise the public revenue by levying and collecting taxes are not
necessarily judicial, and that “due process of law,” as applied to that subject,
does not imply or require the right to such notice and hearing as are considered
to be essential to the validity of the proceedings and judgments of judicial
tribunals.
Ky. R.R. Tax Cases, 115 U.S. 321, 331 (1885).
149. Murray’s Lessee, 59 U.S. at 277–78.
150. MASHAW, supra note 49, at 64.
151. Id.
152. Murray’s Lessee, 59 U.S. at 282.
153. MASHAW, supra note 49, at 46–47, 69–71 (discussing the drawbacks of analysis
based on custom and analogy and noting the recent change to an interest-balancing
methodology).
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What, if anything, does the
protections due to taxpayers.
structure of tax cases’ place in the procedural due process
pantheon tell us about CDP?
Although CDP may appear to have little to do with
procedural due process jurisprudence, there are certain aspects of
CDP that suggest a similarity between the two. First, CDP
requires an administrative, and possibly judicial, determination
of “whether any proposed collection action balances the need for
the efficient collection of taxes with the legitimate concern of the
person that any collection action be no more intrusive than
necessary.”155 There is little authority discussing how the IRS or
courts should balance these competing interests, but the statute
reflects Congress’s explicit acknowledgment that the individual
does have important interests in the collection process—interests
that the due process jurisprudence minimizes. CDP legitimizes
the competing interests at play in the tax collection process, an
analysis essentially absent from Murray’s Lessee and its
progeny.156 Notwithstanding the truism that taxes are the
lifeblood of government, CDP suggests a heightened awareness
that there are important individual interests in the tax collection
process beyond the indirect benefits that flow from a greater
likelihood that the IRS will follow the rule of law in collection
procedures.157

154. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80–81 (1972) (explaining that the procedural
due process standards protect against arbitrary takings). An exception to this is Kahn v.
United States, 753 F.2d 1208, 1220 & n.6 (3d Cir. 1985) (considering the adequacy of the
procedures for imposing a penalty for filing a frivolous income tax return and noting that
cases that merely refer to this mode of analysis provide “little guidance” and are “deficient
in terms of offering a cogent analytical framework”). Kahn applied the three-factor
Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test in upholding the § 6703 procedures for
postassessment judicial review of the frivolous return penalty. Id. at 1219–20, 1222. For a
similar analysis and result, see Lil jenfeldt v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 966, 971–73
(E.D. Wis. 1984) (applying the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test and affirming the
constitutional validity of § 6702 civil penalties for frivolous income tax returns).
155. I.R.C. § 6330(c)(3)(C) (West 2004).
156. MASHAW, supra note 49, at 62–64.
157. These indirect societal benefits may be difficult to conceptualize as individual
rights, but they may have value because of their educative, character-forming, or symbolic
roles. Larry Alexander, Are Procedural Rights Derivative Substantive Rights?, 17 LAW &
PHIL. 19, 32 n.21 (1998). Professor Alexander cautions, however, that because of the
ubiquity of determinations, the government should be wary of the additional costs related
to additional procedural protections. Id. In addition to these indirect benefits of which
Professor Alexander is wary, increased legislative attention to alternatives to full
payment of agreed-upon liabilities, including installment agreements and offers in
compromise, typify Congress’s more direct statement that individuals have statutorily
protected interests in the tax collection process. RRA 98 added provisions for establishing
uniform procedures and guidelines for evaluating offers in compromise. See Internal
Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, 112 Stat.
685; H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 105-599, at 287–289 (1998). RRA 98 also provided changes that
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In addition to placing the CDP-required balancing into some
constitutional context, an understanding of procedural due
process in general, and the outmoded analysis inherent in
Murray’s Lessee in particular, focuses attention on just what the
government interest is in the collection process. This
understanding is important even if one accepts the notion that
constitutional law should not be the engine that drives the
procedural calibration, but rather the legislature or the agency
itself should set procedural protections.158 Consider, for example,
how the legislature should think about the government’s interest
when evaluating the merits of proposing additional collection
rights. How much money that would otherwise be collected does
not get collected due to CDP’s grant of an essentially unfettered
right to taxpayers to stay collection pending administrative
consideration of the matter? What government costs accrue
because of the possibility of delay, even if the taxes are
ultimately collected? What is the net effect on collections of
CDP’s implicit encouragement the IRS and the taxpayer to
consider alternatives to full collection as a distinct resolution to
the IRS’s proposed collection action? Will this encouragement to
consider collection alternatives perhaps contribute to greater
noncompliance as taxpayers increasingly view alternatives to
enforced collection as part of their rational calculus in deciding
whether to comply with their tax obligations in the first place?159
Finally, what are the costs to the system of administering the
CDP provisions, including an appreciation that the IRS as an
agency has limited resources and that CDP may divert agency
resources?
4. Summarizing Tax Cases’ Isolation from Constitutional
Principles. In sum, CDP forces the IRS and courts to consider in
sharper focus the government’s and individuals’ interests in the
tax collection process. This type of focused analysis was absent

increased the availability and consideration of installment agreements. For example, see
I.R.C. § 6159(c), which now requires the Service to enter into installment agreements in
certain circumstances.
158. For the view that it is inappropriate for the courts, through an expansive
procedural due process jurisprudence, to place themselves in the position of
micromanaging the appropriate levels of agency procedures, see Epstein, supra note 127,
at 769–71 (suggesting that the legislative and administrative branches are better
equipped to perform the risk-based analysis inherent in setting appropriate procedural
safeguards).
159. For more on the latter point, see Lederman, Tax Compliance, supra note 58, at
1488 n.190 (positing, for example, that “the offer-in-compromise program may undermine
taxpayer assurance that others are paying their tax obligations by letting taxpayers who
legally owe taxes compromise those obligations for a small fraction of the liability”).
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from the debate leading up to CDP’s enactment and from the
venerable cases considering the constitutionality of tax
adjudications. The import of this subpart, however, is not that
the tax system rests on unsound constitutional footing. Rather,
CDP suggests that the constitutionally sanctioned absolute
discretion the IRS has had in the collection of taxes is not as vital
as those cases imply. The tension between due process and CDP
stems, in part, from CDP’s requirement that, prior to levy or
following the filing of a notice of federal tax lien, a taxpayer can
require the IRS and the appropriate reviewing court to consider
individuals’ rights to collection alternatives and less intrusive
ways of having a liability satisfied.160 Additionally, due process
cases that default to the truism that the government has vital
interests in collecting taxes blur the analysis concerning what
protections taxpayers should have in the collection process,
especially given the IRS’s increasingly important role as a
deliverer of benefits, if one assumes that balancing competing
interests is an appropriate way to calibrate procedural
protections.161
Despite this realization, however, it is not enough to state
that individuals have rights in the tax collection process that
should automatically lead to new hearing and notice rights such
as CDP. Rather than examine procedural protections under the
specter of anecdotal stories of abuse162 or via cloaked informants
railing on IRS mistreatment of taxpayers, the legislature should
carefully weigh the interests at stake when evaluating
substantial shifts in agency resources inherent in a provision like
160. I.R.C. § 6330(a)–(c).
161. Many have pointed out practical and normative critiques of the modern due
process balancing test. For example, Professor Mashaw, while noting the adaptability of
balancing and its recognition that process always involves trade-offs between collective
and individual ends, states that “this brand of utilitarianism has the defects of its virtues,
[and] that, given a good enough reason, the government can use any process it pleases.”
MASHAW, supra note 49, at 47. Professor Mashaw also points out the test’s appetite for
data that is both unknown and perhaps not capable of being known and the difficulty of
comparing an individual’s dignitary costs to administrative costs. Id. For a similar
critique, see Koch, Due Process Calculus, supra note 102, at 643 (noting that the
implementation of the cost-benefit analysis is unsatisfactory because of limited
information, rendering the analysis little more than “judicial guesswork”). Despite its
inherent limitations, balancing benefits in this context from its acknowledgment that
there are competing interests in the tax collection process and that over time society
ascribes increasing importance to rule of law principles in all dealings with the
government, including tax collection.
162. As Professor Camp thoroughly explains, almost all of the allegations of abuse
were subsequently discredited. Camp, supra note 5, at 81 & n.428; see also David Cay
Johnston, Inquiries Find Little Abuse by Tax Agents, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2000, at C1.
See generally David A. Hyman, Lies, Damned Lies, and Narrative, 73 IND. L.J. 797 (1998)
(addressing the risks of anecdote-based legislation).
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CDP. The reality is that CDP is imposing significant costs on the
tax system, and it can be improved, in part by an understanding
of the tax system’s place in the broader context of administrative
and constitutional law. The following Part offers specific
proposals to improve CDP so that it can better serve the
government and individual interests in the collection process.
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS WILL MINIMIZE SYSTEMIC COSTS AND
SHARPEN CDP’S FOCUS ON REGULATING IRS CONDUCT AND
PROTECTING LEGITIMATE INDIVIDUAL INTERESTS
A. Limiting the Opportunities to Challenge the Amount or
Existence of the Liability in CDP Hearings
One important way to limit CDP costs, and to address the
overinclusive nature of CDP as it is currently written, is to
eliminate or reduce the opportunities a taxpayer has to challenge
his underlying liability in CDP hearings. Congress should pass
legislation that eliminates or reduces the avenue for liability
redeterminations in CDP hearings. Under current law, the
taxpayer is entitled to challenge the amount or existence of a
liability if the taxpayer did not receive adequate notice of the
IRS’s proposed deficiency or if the taxpayer otherwise did not
have an opportunity to dispute the underlying liability.163 The
AO, at her discretion, may consider the underlying liability even
if the taxpayer has received adequate notice or otherwise had an
opportunity to dispute the liability, but the AO’s consideration
does not become part of the formal CDP determination and is not
subject to judicial review.164 A recent case also concluded that a
taxpayer who self-reports a liability (by filing a balance due tax
return) can also challenge that liability (and maybe even demand
a refund) in a CDP hearing.165 Although collection issues have
been the most prevalent in CDP cases, challenges to the amount
or existence of the liability, or disputes concerning whether the
taxpayer received adequate notice, are not uncommon.166

163. I.R.C. § 6330(c)(2)(B).
164. Treas. Reg. § 301.6330-1(e)(3) Q&A-E11 (2004).
165. See Montgomery v. Comm’r, 122 T.C. 1, 7–8, 10 (2004) (concluding that the
underlying tax liability in I.R.C. § 6330(c)(2)(B) includes an amount self-assessed and that
the plain language of the statute supports such taxpayer challenges because a taxpayer
filing a balance due return has not received a statutory notice of deficiency with respect to
that liability or otherwise had a judicial or administrative opportunity to dispute it).
166. Department of Treasury General Explanations of the Administration’s Fiscal
Year 2004 Revenue Proposals 91 (2003), reprinted in 2003 TAX NOTES TODAY 23, Feb. 4,
2003, LEXIS, 2003 TNT 23-11.
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The policy behind letting taxpayers raise the issue of
underlying liability in the context of CDP determinations is
twofold: (1) it is foolish to consider collection alternatives if the
taxpayer does not in fact owe the underlying liability, and (2)
pre-CDP procedures may not provide sufficient opportunities to
challenge tax liabilities. Yet taxpayers have important
preassessment rights to challenge the amount or existence of a
liability. For example, the IRS is required to provide a taxpayer
with a notification of its belief that thetaxpayer owes taxes in
addition to those the taxpayer reflected on his tax return, and the
notification must be reasonably designed to reach the taxpayer.167
Pegging the right to dispute income tax liability to actual notice
when the liability relates to an IRS-determined additional tax
liability makes some sense. After all, it is possible that the IRS
might satisfy its last-known-address notice requirements, but
that the taxpayer might not get actual receipt in time to petition
the Tax Court for relief.168 Therefore, the taxpayer would not be
able to challenge the IRS’s adjustments unless he was to pay the
tax and file a refund claim. For a taxpayer unable to afford the
tax payment, the refund remedy might be theoretical only,169 and
the taxpayer might face the threat of enforced collection on an
erroneous liability.
The problem with allowing judicial review of liability
determinations in CDP proceedings, however, is that it is
difficult and wasteful for the IRS to prove that a taxpayer did in
fact receive the notice. Opening the door to liability
considerations in CDP cases dilutes the provisions’ focus on
regulating and overseeing IRS collection conduct and it
substantially increases CDP’s costs to agency and court

167. For a discussion of the relationship between the IRS’s obligation to notify
taxpayers of a proposed deficiency and traditional due process notice considerations, see
Lederman, “Civil”izing, supra note 52, at 214–23. Section 6212(a) authorizes the IRS to
send a statutory notice of deficiency to a taxpayer by certified or registered mail. I.R.C.
§ 6212(a). If the taxpayer receives the notice in a timely manner, the IRS has satisfied its
notice requirements and may assess tax if the taxpayer fails to file a timely petition to the
Tax Court. I.R.C. § 6212(c). In addition, § 6212(b) provides for constructive notice if the
IRS sends a notice of deficiency to the taxpayer’s “last known address.” I.R.C. § 6212(b)(1);
e.g., Abeles v. Comm’r, 91 T.C. 1019, 1029–31 (1988) (noting that the last known address
is that which appears on the taxpayer’s most recently filed return, absent a clear and
concise notification of a different address).
168. See Sego v. Comm’r, 114 T.C. 604, 610–11 (2000) (considering a taxpayer’s claim
that she did not receive notice of deficiency despite IRS and postal service records
indicating attempted delivery and ultimately finding that the notices were left at her
residence).
169. See Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145, 195–96 (1960) (Whittaker, J.,
dissenting) (pointing out that the refund remedy may be of little practical consequence if
the taxpayer is unable to pay the assessed liability).
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resources. Moreover, many of the cases involving disputes
concerning the underlying liability involve protestor-type issues,
and the Tax Court has recently begun sanctioning taxpayers for
raising frivolous matters in CDP hearings. These frivolous claims
take up a disproportionate amount of judicial and administrative
resources.170
Even if Congress is unwilling to eliminate the liability
category completely, it should legislatively overrule Montgomery
171
v. Commissioner, which held that taxpayers can challenge the
amount or existence of a liability in a CDP hearing even if the
liability arises from filing a tax return with an unpaid tax
liability.172 Allowing taxpayers in CDP hearings to challenge the
underlying liability resulting from self-assessed tax liabilities is
an inappropriate use of IRS and court resources.173 Taxpayers are
always free to request that the IRS administratively abate the
liability by filing an amended tax return, and if the taxpayer still
disagrees with the IRS, the taxpayer can pursue a refund action
in federal court. The policy of allowing challenges to the liability
stems, in part, from discomfort with erroneous governmental
determinations in which taxpayers have not had opportunity to
make their case. When liabilities and IRS-proposed collection
actions stem from taxpayers’ own errors or a change in views, it
is not worth the additional costs to the system of allowing those
taxpayers to use CDP as a mechanism to challenge the
underlying liability. CDP is not meant to create a forum for
correcting taxpayer errors; rather, it is meant to provide
oversight to IRS collection activities.

170. See Cords, supra note 5 (manuscript at 47–48); e.g., Hauck v. Comm’r, T.C.M.
(RIA) 2002-184 (2002), aff’d, No. 02-2301, 2003 WL 21005238 (6th Cir. May 2, 2003)
(upholding sanction). For a discussion of the disproportionate amount of resources that
frivolous requests consume, see STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 108TH CONG.,
REPORT OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION RELATING TO THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE
AS REQUIRED BY THE IRS REFORM AND RESTRUCTURING ACT OF 1998, at 81 (Comm. Print
2003). However, allowing the AO to exercise his discretion in considering the underlying
liability makes sense as well, but subjecting that determination and the determination
regarding the ability to challenge the underlying liability to judicial oversight provides
little benefit and great opportunity for mischief in the hands of certain taxpayers. To
ensure the proper balance between taxpayer and IRS rights, regulations should provide
factors for when the AO should exercise that discretion favorably. Nonexclusive factors
could include actual notice of the IRS’s proposed assessment, economic hardship, and the
taxpayer’s cooperation with IRS Appeals to provide all information necessary to make
that determination.
171. 122 T.C. 1 (2004).
172. Id. at 10.
173. For a similar policy critique, see id. at 20–22 (Gerber, J., dissenting).
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B. The Form of CDP Hearings
Insights from constitutional and administrative law dictate
that the IRS should have great flexibility in setting appropriate
procedures for CDP hearings. Taking a cue from the utilitarian
approach to gauging the amount of process necessary for
procedural due process purposes, the procedures the IRS offers in
a particular CDP hearing should reflect the nature of the interest
at stake in the hearing and the likelihood that the procedure
offered will contribute to the IRS reaching a correct result. This
understanding requires the IRS to consider what it is the
taxpayer is requesting that the IRS consider at the CDP hearing.
In CDP cases, the IRS and courts have been taking a
schizophrenic approach to what a CDP hearing is, whether
taxpayers are entitled to face-to-face hearings,174 and whether
correspondence or telephonic conferences are adequate as a
matter of law.175 The extent of a hearing may directly affect IRS
resources expended on CDP and the length of time the IRS has to
resolve a matter. Moreover, the extent of the hearing may have a
direct impact on a court’s ability to undertake meaningful review,
if that review is truly based upon the “abuse of discretion”
standard found in administrative law.
Some observers have criticized the lack of uniformity in CDP
hearings.176 Yet administrative law reveals that with informal
adjudications, the agency has few constraints on what constitutes
a hearing.177 The extent of the hearing should vary with respect to
the particular relief or task the taxpayer is requesting that the
AO consider. There is a great variety in terms of what is at stake
within CDP hearings, and not every CDP hearing will have
benefits associated with additional procedures. This insight is
crucial to an understanding that the IRS may reduce its costs
significantly by minimizing the extent of the procedures
automatically offered to taxpayers in the CDP context.
Regulations should clarify this potential for procedural reduction,

174. See Treas. Reg. § 301.6330-1(d)(2) Q&A-D7 (2004) (stating that if a taxpayer
wants a face-to-face hearing, a taxpayer “must be offered an opportunity for a hearing at
the Appeals office closest to taxpayer’s residence or, in the case of a business taxpayer, the
taxpayer’s principal place of business”). The regulations also provide, somewhat
inconsistently, that the hearings are not formal under the APA and do not require a faceto-face meeting but that the CDP hearing might constitute a meeting or one or more oral
or written communications between IRS Appeals and the taxpayer. Treas. Reg.
§ 301.6330-1(d)(2) Q&A-D6.
175. See Cords, supra note 5 (manuscript at 14–25).
176. See id. (manuscript at 42) (proposing a single approach to CDP hearings).
177. Refer to notes 66–67 supra and accompanying text (reviewing separation of
agency adjudications and rulemaking into formal and informal categories).

10412-TEXT.NATIVE.1105543696

1194

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

1/12/2005 7:28 AM

[41:4

and courts should embrace it when considering taxpayer
challenges to IRS CDP determinations.
This point is illustrated by recalling the very tasks the IRS
is supposed to, or authorized to, perform at a CDP hearing. For
example, in the CDP determination process, the AO is supposed
to satisfy its verification requirement—that the IRS has followed
its administrative and procedural rules in the assessment of the
tax that is subject to the IRS collection action.178 If the taxpayer
in a CDP request is only challenging whether the IRS has
verified that applicable laws or procedures have been followed
and is not requesting any other relief, then there is little need for
extensive telephonic or face-to-face contact. The verification
requirement is easily satisfied without much delay or many
administrative resources, yet existing regulations suggest that a
taxpayer should be given a face-to-face meeting even if he is only
requesting evidence that the verification requirement has been
satisfied.179 This makes little sense.
Moreover, the balancing requirement in the context of
ind
i vidual determinations—that the AO is supposed to balance
the need for efficient collection of taxes with the legitimate
concern that the collection action be no more intrusive than
necessary—seems best satisfied without direct taxpayer contact.
The regulations and case law, however, have provided little
guidance on what an AO is supposed to do to satisfy the
balancing obligation,180 and this provision is better understood as

178. There is no particular documentation on which the IRS is required to rely in
order to satisfy this requirement. See Craig v. Comm’r, 119 T.C. 252, 261–62 (2002)
(dismissing petitioner’s allegations that the AO failed to obtain verification from the
Secretary that the requirements of all applicable laws and administrative procedures
were met as required by section 6330(c)(1) because section 6330(c)(1) does not require the
officer to rely upon a particular document in order to satisfy this requirement).
179. The AO should supply written evidence of its verification to the taxpayer to
minimize disputes and to allow the taxpayer to submit information showing that the IRS
verification may be erroneous. Courts do not require that this verification be provided to
the taxpayer, and a legislative change may be needed to require the IRS to provide this to
taxpayers—a task that would not consume much in the way of agency resources. See
Book, supra note 119, at 1137 (arguing that the reduction of the AO’s verification to
writing would aid in disputes); Cords, supra note 5 (manuscript at 35 & n.226) (citing
Nester v. Comm’r, 118 T.C. 162, 166 (2002)); see Fahey, supra note 32, at 465–66
(questioning whether the failure of an AO “to obtain a timely verification can be rectified
at the time of judicial review”).
180. See Cords, supra note 5 (manuscript at 39) (“The statute provides no guidance
on how the balancing is to be performed or even what factors should be considered.”). The
“no more intrusive than necessary” standard seems to be best applied with respect to
determining which assets the IRS might seize to satisfy an outstanding debt; it is possible
that taxpayers would wish to preserve some assets, such as income-producing assets,
assets set aside for retirement, or assets with particular sentimental value, yet the CDP
hearing occurs before the IRS has necessarily chosen which asset or assets it will seize.
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a broader legislative directive for the IRS to acknowledge that,
notwithstanding the long history of administrative and
constitutional law jurisprudence minimizing taxpayer rights in
the collection process, individuals do have important rights in tax
collection adjudications.
Under CDP, the IRS is not independently required to
consider collection alternatives on behalf of the taxpayer, and
implicit in CDP is the ability of taxpayers to request that the AO
consider the propriety of collection alternatives that the taxpayer
believes are appropriate.181 If a taxpayer does request collection
alternatives, the individual’s interest is more directly identified,
thus justifying greater use of IRS resources and possibly even a
face-to-face meeting. Moreover, because there is an increased risk
of error in reaching its CDP determination without direct
taxpayer contact when the hearing involves a collection
alternative,182 there is an additional justification for greater IRS
resources in the CDP hearing. The increased risk of error arises
because in all considerations of collection alternatives, the IRS is
required to consider a taxpayer’s financial circumstances. These
circumstances, while summarized on IRS forms and checked for
reasonableness with published IRS standards, often require
additional information from the taxpayer in order for the IRS to
perform its review function adequately. For example, if a
taxpayer was to argue that special circumstances warranted a
deviation from IRS standards when determining the taxpayer’s
reasonable collection potential, that explanation might be
difficult to make via correspondence only and might justify the
additional time expended for a face-to-face meeting.
To be sure, the approach described above has some
difficulties. The relatively high percentage of pro se taxpayers in
the CDP process and the open-ended nature of Form 12153,
which taxpayers use to request CDP hearings,183 make the IRS’s

The standard also seems to be appropriate in considering whether the IRS should file a
notice of federal tax lien to protect its interest, but a taxpayer has independent grounds
apart from this balancing requirement to request that the IRS withdraw its notice of
federal tax lien; it is not clear that this balancing requirement would supersede this
standard or impose additional obligations on the IRS. See I.R.C. § 6323(j)(1) (West 2004)
(providing that the IRS may withdraw a notice of federal tax lien in certain
circumstances, including if the withdrawal will “facilitate the collection of the tax
liability”).
181. Refer to Part II.A.2 supra (listing the new rights CDP provides the taxpayer).
182. Such an increased risk of error tends to implicate the desirability of a
predeprivation hearing. Refer to note 130 supra (discussing the three-part inquiry under
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 323 (1976)).
183. Pro se litigants constituted seventy percent of the cases of judicial review of
CDP determinations in 2002. IRS, NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE; FISCAL YEAR 2002
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task of determining the adequacy of CDP procedures more
difficult. If the taxpayer is inarticulate or unsophisticated so that
the request for a CDP hearing is vague or ill-defined, it is
difficult for the IRS to determine what procedures are adequate.
Yet, as suggested by other observers, the IRS could assist
taxpayers by better informing them of their specific individual
rights in the CDP process.184 If a taxpayer was better able to
request specific relief at an early stage in the process, the IRS
would be able to identify whether the taxpayer was requesting a
legitimate consideration of collection alternatives—which would
require a mere verification that the IRS followed its procedures—
or was in fact raising a request based upon frivolous arguments
or merely to delay collection. Each warrants a different IRS
response and a different type of hearing.
C. True Abuse of Discretion Review
General administrative law principles limit litigants from
introducing new evidence when courts are hearing appeals from
informal agency adjudications that are subject to abuse of
discretion review.185 This on-the-record rule has no counterpart in
tax law, in which the Tax Court, even in reviews of IRS
determinations completed on an abuse of discretion basis,
generally lets taxpayers introduce evidence that was not before
the IRS when it reached its determination.186 Beyond fidelity to
historical practice, the underlying rationale for treating tax
adjudications differently than other agency adjudications is that
the new information might enable the court to reach a correct
result—a result that might be different from the agency’s
because of the court’s consideration of new matters.
The Tax Court’s approach to abuse of discretion review is
implicitly based on a belief that it is worth sacrificing efficiency
ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 276, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irsutl/nta_2002_annual_rpt.pdf.
Form 12153 is incomplete in that it does not provide a checklist for the types of
issues that Appeals could consider; rather, it provides a blank space for a
taxpayer to explain why she does not agree with the proposed collection action.
For a taxpayer who is unaware of what issues the AO could consider at the CDP
hearing, this could prevent the taxpayer from fully exercising her rights. The
IRS should modify the form to allow a taxpayer to easily identify issues she
wishes for Appeals to consider.
Book, supra note 119, at 1146 n.155.
184. 2003 REPORT, supra note 3, at 43–45 (suggesting that IRS Appeals should better
inform taxpayers about their rights to seek collection alternatives in the CDP process).
185. Refer to Part III.B.4 supra (discussing Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v.
Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971)).
186. See Ewing v. Comm’r, 122 T.C. 32 (2004).
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for more complete judicial hearings because the additional
procedures may lead the court to conclude, in certain
circumstances, that the taxpayer would be entitled to full or
partial relief. In addition to the tangible costs to both the parties
and the judiciary associated with a hearing in which the parties
introduce facts on a de novo basis, the introduction of new
evidence takes away the court’s emphasis on agency practice, and
review tends to become more of a judicial substitution of
judgment, rather than a mechanism for external control of
agency practice—the very rationale for CDP in the first place.187
Allowing the IRS to supplement its agency factfinding at
trial, or to justify its reasoning in a de novo proceeding, might
create incentives for the IRS to minimize protections across the
board that would promote fidelity to rule of law principles. In a
perceptive dissenting opinion in Ewing v. Commissioner, Judge
Halpern suggests that the Tax Court’s decision to hold de novo
proceedings in matters subject to abuse of discretion review
should not be extended to review of IRS determinations that are
not “relevant to . . . the existence or amount of a deficiency in tax
or an addition to tax that is subject to our deficiency
jurisdiction.”188 As Judge Halpern implies, the reach of the Tax
Court rule should not extend to proceedings in which the
provisions at issue, like CDP, were meant to provide oversight
with respect to IRS activity and in which the provisions are not
related to the Tax Court’s traditional role of redetermining the
proper amount of a taxpayer’s tax liability. Provisions like CDP,
although a radical departure for a court like the Tax Court, are
much more consistent with traditional notions of judicial review
of agency conduct, and CDP’s adoption is evidence that there is
little special justification warranting a radically different
approach to review of IRS conduct.
This notion that limiting courts’ ability to substitute their
judgment or to consider new evidence may promote agency
fidelity to rule of law seems counter-intuitive. Yet requiring
agency action to stand or fall based on the information and
explanation the agency presents to a reviewing court will expose

187. See, e.g., id. at 67–68 (Halpern and Holmes, J.J., dissenting).
[W]e fail to see how the majority has done anything other than ignore its
description of the abuse of discretion standard and, instead, substitute its
judgment for respondent’s, both as to the procedures prescribed by the Secretary
pursuant to section 6015(f) and respondent’s determination of various factual
issues in this case.
Id.
188. Id. at 65 (Halpern and Holmes, J.J., dissenting).
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189
agency practices to judicial scrutiny. In essence, the Tax Court
approach fails to appreciate that review of collection
determinations is intended as a means to provide oversight to
IRS activities and is not about identifying agency error on an
individualized basis.190 This approach is radically different from
de novo review, under which the court is concerned with the right
answer, regardless of the agency action preceding the court
191
review.
A possible means to ensure that courts neither substitute
their own judgment for that of the agency nor consider new
evidence at trial would be legislation clarifying that CDP
determinations are informal adjudications under the APA and, as
such, should be governed by the APA’s standards of review of
agency determinations. Greater fidelity to administrative lawbased notions of abuse of discretion review would place a
premium on the IRS’s determination of what procedures it will
need to ensure that courts sustain its CDP determinations. For
example, limiting the ability of the IRS to develop an after-thefact rationale for its determination or supplement its evidence
before the court would create incentives for the IRS to provide
appropriate procedures at the administrative hearing.
Some of the courts’ problems with review of collection
determinations stem from the uncertainty associated with abuse
of discretion review in tax cases. The contrast with other case
types is stark when considering the relevance of agency actions
in traditional tax cases, where taxpayers are not entitled to
detailed information concerning the IRS’s thought process or
rationale in deficiency cases.192 At the other end of the spectrum,

189. See generally 2 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 12:13,
at 459–60 (2d ed. 1979) (discussing “the Nickey principle,” which states that a collection
suit must be “‘open to a defendant . . . to assail the correctness and legal sufficiency of the
assessment’” (alteration in original) (quoting Nickey v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 393, 396
(1934))).
190. See Koch, Judicial Review, supra note 73, at 476.
Review for potential error, however, must recognize the benefits of leaving to the
decisionmaker freedom to make some mistakes as to the individuals. . . .
The purpose of individualizing discretion is to allow the agency to fine
tune the rules—administrative, judicial, or statutory—to do individual justice;
the court controls only for extreme risk of error in such judgments.
Id.
191. “That the court disagrees with the core discretionary decision is irrelevant as
long as there is an adequate probability that the official might be right.” Id. Professor
Koch notes that the challenge with court review is that courts need to be selective in
choosing to review individualized decisions—for example, properly examining the core
decision when there appears to be a pattern of agency conduct contributing to the risk of
agency error. Id. at 478.
192. Refer to note 86 supra for a discussion of Greenberg’s Express, Inc. v.
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abuse of discretion review has at its “focal point . . . the
administrative record already in existence, not some new record
made initially in the reviewing court.”193 The following discussion
considers some courts’ struggles with the type of review in CDP,
and offers courts and the IRS suggestions for facilitating its
abuse of discretion review of CDP collection determinations.
1. Confusion in Some CDP Cases Stems from the
Amorphous Nature of the Administrative Record. The relative
isolation of tax cases from administrative law principles explains
some of the tension within recent CDP cases and the information
a reviewing court can expect to have before it when it determines
whether IRS collection alternative decisions withstand abuse of
discretion analysis. The case of Mesa Oil v. United States194 is a
prime example of courts trying to come to terms with concepts
that have no predicate in the tax law. In Mesa Oil, the taxpayer
fell behind by over $425,000 in payroll tax deposits over a oneyear period.195 The IRS issued a notice of intent to levy and filed a
notice of federal tax lien, both of which triggered rights to a CDP
hearing for the relevant tax period.196 In writing, the taxpayer
requested that the IRS release its Notice of Federal Tax Lien and
permit it to make installment payments of approximately
$40,000 per month.197 The AO responded to the taxpayer and
stated that it was scheduling a CDP hearing. Following the
hearing, the AO issued the following unsupported determination:
“the proposed collection action balances the need for the efficient
collection of taxes with the taxpayer’s legitimate concern that
any collection action be no more intrusive than necessary.”198
The letters to and from the AO and the above determination
were the extent of the information before the district court in
Commissioner in this paper. Because the notice of determination, like a notice of
deficiency, also serves a jurisdictional function, it is appropriate for a court not to look
behind the notice when considering jurisdictional questions arising from an agency
determination. This is very different, however, from a court’s role in performing its review
of agency actions. It is important to understand that a CDP notice of determination serves
different functions, and a court’s willingness to look behind that notice should depend
upon which function is relevant to the particular review in question. For a discussion of
the differing roles of notice of deficiency, see Lederman, Deficient Statutory Notices, supra
note 86, at 117–18 (discussing how one role of the notice of deficiency is that of a
jurisdictional “ticket to the Tax Court” and arguing that vague notices should not deprive
the Tax Court of jurisdiction).
193. Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973).
194. No. Civ.A 00-B-851, 2000 WL 1745280 (D. Colo. Nov. 21, 2000).
195. Id. at *1.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
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conducting its review. Mesa Oil acknowledged that IRS Appeals
hearings have traditionally been informal, but it offered the
insight that “informality does not completely obviate the need for
a record of some sort.”199 The opinion went on to point out that a
full stenographic record was not required, yet it inconsistently
remanded the matter back to IRS Appeals to produce a record of
the proceedings at the administrative level “sufficient to record
the evidence or arguments presented at the hearing, as well as
the analysis used by the Appeals Officer in making a
Determination” and it mandated that this record “may be made
either through audio tape recording, video tape recording, or
stenographer; along with all paper documents presented by the
parties.”200
Mesa Oil suggests that courts do not, under administrative
law principles, have the power to compel agencies to adopt
specific procedures in informal adjudications. The court in Mesa
Oil, however, ordered the AO to produce a verbatim transcript of
the proceedings. This inconsistency is unfortunate but not
surprising when one understands that inconsistency surrounds
informal adjudications under general administrative law. What
separates informal adjudications from formal adjudications
under the APA is the requirement that the review of formal
adjudications complete on the record.201 This suggests that in
informal proceedings, the record below is somehow less
important. Yet that suggestion is not correct. If a reviewing court
is to stay true to its task of genuinely reviewing informal abuse of
discretion matters according to Overton Park’s standards, it will
essentially need an understanding of all the facts that the IRS
considered below. To facilitate review, an agency may wish to
adopt procedures that will preserve the facts and law considered
by the adjudicator. Certainly the transcript or recording the
Mesa Oil court wanted to see would have facilitated judicial
review and avoided messy factual disputes about what exactly
was before the AO when she reached a determination. However,
administrative law principles generally state that courts cannot
impose additional procedural requirements on administrative
agencies,202 and Mesa Oil, to the extent that the district court
suggested it could do so, is wrongly decided.
199. Id. at *7.
200. Id.
201. See Young, supra note 67, at 185 n.20 (explaining that “the APA’s provisions for
rulemaking and adjudication state that proceedings are formal if the agency’s organic act
‘require[s] [them] to be made on the record after opportunity for agency hearing’”
(alterations in original) (quoting 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(c), 554(a), 554(c)(2) (1994))).
202. Refer to note 68 supra.
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Where does this leave the IRS in fashioning its CDP
procedures? A better reading of Mesa Oil is that it puts the IRS
on notice of its obligation when issuing a notice of determination
to explain both its conclusion, and the factual and legal
information justifying its conclusion either in the determination
itself or in contemporaneously created administrative files. If a
taxpayer appeals the determination, the IRS must provide the
reviewing court with all such information in conjunction with the
filing of a dispositive motion or at trial.203 Absent adequate
documentation, courts are placed in the unenviable role of
recreating what exactly was before the AO, leading to all sorts of
“he said, she said” possibilities and increasing the likelihood that
a matter cannot be decided without remand or the admission of
additional evidence from hearing participants.
2. The IRS Should Allow Taxpayers to Record a CDP
Hearing when It Offers Taxpayers a Face-to-Face Hearing. The
confusion over the exact nature of a record and the need for a
transcript are also highlighted by two Tax Court opinions, Keene
v. Commissioner204 and Kemper v. Commissioner,205 decided on
the same day. Both cases consider whether a taxpayer is entitled
to an audiotape of a CDP hearing.206 Keene was ostensibly
decided on the basis of statutory interpretation principles,
namely, whether I.R.C. section 7512(a)(1), which permits
taxpayers to make audio recordings of “any in-person interview
with any taxpayer relating to the determination or collection of
any tax,” extends to CDP hearings.207 In Keene, the taxpayer
refused to participate in a face-to-face hearing with IRS Appeals

203. See, e.g., Muhammad v. United States, No. 0:02-2677-17BD, 2003 WL 22753568,
at *1 (D.S.C. Apr. 9, 2003) (denying government motion to dismiss taxpayer’s challenge to
CDP determination sustaining a frivolous tax return penalty because the IRS failed to
provide documents or other evidence supporting the AO’s justification for his
determination).
204. 121 T.C. 4129 (2003).
205. 86 T.C.M. (CCH) 12 (2003).
206. See Keene, 121 T.C. at 4129; Kemper, 86 T.C.M. (CCH) at 15.
207. See Keene, 121 T.C. at 4129. I.R.C. § 7521(a)(1) in its entirety reads:
(a) Recording of interviews—
(1) Recording by taxpayer—Any officer or employee of the Internal
Revenue Service in connection with any in-person interview with any taxpayer
relating to the determination or collection of any tax shall, upon advance request
of such taxpayer, allow the taxpayer to make an audio recording of such
interview at the taxpayer’s own expense and with the taxpayer’s own
equipment.
I.R.C. § 7521(a)(1) (West 2004). Mesa Oil did not consider the application of § 7521(a) to
CDP hearings. See Mesa Oil v. United States, No. Civ.A 00-B-851, 2000 WL 1745280 (D.
Colo. Nov. 21, 2000).
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208
The
after he was told that he could not audio record it.
taxpayer exchanged no meaningful correspondence with the IRS
in light of the AO’s refusal to permit the recording. The IRS
stipulated in Keene that if the Tax Court found that I.R.C.
section 7521(a) applied to CDP hearings, then the matter should
be remanded to IRS Appeals.209 Using a plain language analysis,
the Keene majority held that CDP hearings relate to the
collection of tax under I.R.C. section 7521(a) and that a CDP
hearing was an interview for these purposes.210
Keene is more than a case about statutory interpretation
because the majority relied on its opinion of the nature of CDP
hearings to bolster its rationale, including its opinion respecting
the need to look behind determination notices when performing
review functions:
[R]espondent’s interpretation of section 7521(a)(1) would
lead to the anomalous result of allowing the audio recording
of Examination Division interviews, which are proceedings
that we typically do not review, but not allowing the
recording of section 6330 hearings, which are proceedings
that we are statutorily charged with reviewing . . . .

. . . [R]espondent’s interpretation of section 7521(a)(1)
would complicate judicial review of the [Appeals office]
determination . . . . Having
a
transcript
of
the
administrative hearing would certainly facilitate that
review . . . .
In addition, when reviewing for abuse of discretion, . . .
[h]aving a transcript would eliminate a possible dispute
between the parties concerning the scope of the issues that
were raised by the taxpayer in the administrative
211
hearing.

208. Keene, 121 T.C. at 4131.
209. Id. at 4134.
210. See Keene, 121 T.C. at 4132–33. The court explained that a
[CDP] hearing is an integral part of the tax collection process and therefore
relates to the “collection of any tax” within the meaning of section
7521(a)(1) . . . [because] the Commissioner generally may not collect a tax by
levy or permit a notice of Federal tax lien to remain on the public record without
first offering the taxpayer [a CDP] hearing.
Id. at 4133. The court also explained that “the general and ordinary definitions of
‘interview’ suggest [that] the exchange of information that occurs between a taxpayer and
an Appeals officer during [a CDP] hearing . . . constitutes an ‘in-person interview’ within
the meaning of that term as used in section 7521(a)(1).” Id. The case was then remanded
back to IRS Appeals to allow for the taxpayer to audio record the hearing. Id. at 4134.
211. Keene, 121 T.C. at 4133–34 (citations omitted).
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Except for some overreaching comments that suggested it
would be contrary to Congress’s intent to have fair and impartial
CDP hearings without transcripts,212 the majority’s opinion that
audio recordings would facilitate judicial review is accurate in
light of both Overton Park and general administrative law
principles. Yet the novelty of looking at IRS conduct in tax cases
is illustrated by a dissent in Keene, which argues that a
transcript or audio recording would not be helpful in reviewing
CDP determinations. Noting that some deficiency cases are
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard and that “we
typically do not go behind the notice of deficiency,”213 the dissent
stated that there was nothing anomalous in allowing recording of
exam interviews but not CDP hearings because “we are no more
charged with reviewing ‘section 6330 hearings’ than we are
charged with reviewing ‘Examination Division interviews.’”214
Although this view is hard to reconcile with Overton Park, it is
true that in deficiency cases based on an abuse of discretion
standard, the Tax Court typically appears less like a court
reviewing agency conduct and more like a body seeking to get to
the right answer without regard to administrative law
principles.215 Yet the rationale for CDP is that there needs to be
external oversight of IRS collection action and that true abuse of
discretion review provides the means to examine that conduct.
The implication in the dissent’s view is that tax cases are so
different from other cases that they justify a unique approach to
agency conduct review, an approach that emphasizes efficiency
over oversight but is hard to reconcile with the rule of law
principles underlying CDP.
On the same day that the Tax Court decided Keene, the Tax
Court in Kemper granted summary judgment to the IRS in
another CDP case involving a taxpayer who had demanded
unsuccessfully that the IRS AO record his CDP hearing.216 Like
Keene, Kemper involved a taxpayer raising frivolous challenges to
the tax collection system, but unlike Keene, the AO held an in212. Id. at 4134 (“[N]ot having a transcript may contravene the intent of Congress in
providing for a fair and impartial administrative hearing and may have a negative impact
on this Court’s review of the Appeals Office determination.”) Although the latter is likely
true, it is a stretch, under both general administrative law principles and CDP’s
legislative history, to equate the lack of a transcript with an unfair or partial IRS Appeals
hearing.
213. Id. at 4143 n.6 (Chiechi, J., dissenting) (citing Greenberg’s Express, Inc. v.
Comm’r, 62 T.C. 324, 327 (1974)).
214. Keene, 121 T.C. at 4143 (Chiechi, J., dissenting).
215. See Ewing v. Comm’r, 122 T.C. 32, 49 (2004) (finding that the IRS abused its
discretion in rejecting taxpayer’s request for equitable innocent spouse relief).
216. Kemper v. Comm’r, 86 T.C.M. (CCH) 12, 12, 15 (2003).
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person meeting even though the AO refused to record the
meeting.217 Finding that the AO’s refusal to record the conference
was contrary to I.R.C. section 7521(a)(1), the Tax Court
nonetheless granted summary judgment in favor of the IRS and,
for good measure, imposed an $8500 penalty on the plaintiff for
raising frivolous contentions.218 To reach its decision, the Tax
Court relied on language from an earlier case suggesting that
holding a hearing might not be necessary if the hearing would
only involve frivolous matters,219 and the Tax Court concluded
that the frivolous positions made it “not necessary” and
“not . . . productive” to remand the case to IRS Appeals.220
It is hard to fault the result in Kemper because the taxpayer
relied on tired tax protestor arguments in his CDP challenge.221 If
the IRS were to grant an in-person meeting (and I have
suggested that it need not always offer this to taxpayers), it
makes sense to allow taxpayers to record the in-person hearing,
especially given the importance of agency conduct to a court’s
performance of abuse of discretion review. Although there are
some procedural differences between the cases—in Kemper, there
was no AO meeting with the taxpayer and the IRS stipulated
that if the Tax Court found in favor of the taxpayer on the issue,
the matter should be remanded—on the surface, the cases seem
difficult to reconcile. Nonetheless, the rationale for the result in
Kemper is far from precise, partially because of the uncertain
reach of one case the Court relied on for its summary dismissal, a
case in which the Tax Court suggested that the IRS need not
hold CDP hearings when the only matters involved are
frivolous.222

217. Id. at 14.
218. Id. at 16.
219. Id. (citing Lunsford v. Comm’r, 117 T.C. 183, 189 (2001)).
220. Id.
221. Id. at 15 n.7 (citing Keown v. Comm’r, T.C.M. (RIA) 2003-069 (2003)).
222. Lunsford, 117 T.C. at 189. As mentioned above, I believe courts would be better
served by adopting a flexible understanding of what a hearing is, rather than suggesting
that the IRS may choose not to offer a hearing when it determines that to be expedient.
The state of law in this area is far from settled. One way to reconcile Kemper and Keene is
suggested by a concurring opinion in Keene that points to APA section 706, which provides
that courts “shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside agency action . . . found to
be . . . without observance of procedure required by law,” but also directs that, in making
its determinations, courts should also give “due account” to the “rule of prejudicial error.”
Keene, 121 T.C. at 4135 (Halpern, J., concurring). In administrative law, reviewing courts
disregard procedural errors unless the complaining party was prejudiced by the error. For
more on the harmless error doctrine, see Nestor v. Comm’r, 118 T.C. 162, 173 (2002)
(Halpern, J., concurring).
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D. The Current Distinction Between Judicial Review of Collection
Determinations in CDP Cases and Other Collection
Determinations
Understanding the administrative law context for CDP
brings into question whether IRS considerations of collection
alternatives outside the CDP process should likewise be subject
to judicial review on an abuse of discretion basis. After all, if, as
administrative law scholars emphasize, even highly deferential
judicial review of agency action provides incentives for better
agency practice, increases public confidence in agency practice,
and is an integral part of our system of checks and balances,223
then why should the availability of judicial review of IRS
decisions on collection alternatives be dependent upon whether
the IRS itself is taking collection action? Although there has been
greater attention to the overinclusive aspects of CDP (and the
previous discussion in this Part reveals a mechanism for
reducing systemic costs associated with those aspects), it is
possible that CDP does not go far enough, in that IRS
consideration of collection alternatives is generally not subject to
judicial review unless the IRS action is the subject of a CDP
hearing.
There are systemic costs associated with a proposal to
expand CDP hearings, including the limited precedential value of
thecases, the sheer number of cases that might flood the system,
and the tangible costs associated with formality that review of
factual issues might impose (when agency discretion is subject to
review, the agency must write an opinion explaining its actions
and factual premises to develop a record).224 It is likely that the
IRS would vigorously oppose any such expansion, especially in
light of its likely view that the relatively small number of cases
in which courts have reversed or modified its CDP
determinations is evidence of sound agency conduct.225 Yet
correcting CDP’s excesses should free IRS resources. CDP’s focus
on regulating agency conduct, and not necessarily on correcting
individual taxpayer error, suggests that the success of the
provision should not be based on the number of reversals or
modifications, but rather on the broader effects that the
provisions would create, thereby improving IRS collection
procedures.

223. See Levin, supra note 75, at 742.
224. Id. at 747–49.
225. 2003 REPORT, supra note 3, at 50 (noting that only one-tenth of one percent of
CDP cases have been overturned or conceded on appeal).
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V. CONCLUSION
CDP is a dramatic change in terms of providing external
oversight to IRS conduct, but it is not so dramatic when placed in
the broader context of agency action, administrative law, and
constitutional law developments. CDP forces the judiciary to
consider the IRS’s conduct in a much more direct way than ever
before. Focusing solely on CDP’s costs and the government’s
interests in reducing costs and collecting taxes ignores the
legitimate individual interest in the collection process. Forcing
the IRS in its collection practices to pay more attention to rule of
law principles is consistent with the broader administrative and
constitutional law contexts and may promote better, more
uniform agency practice and increased respect for, and
confidence in, the tax system.

